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ABSTRACT
Networked systems are ubiquitous in our modern society. They are found in settings that vary
from mundane enterprise IT systems to critical infrastructure systems. The security of networked
systems is important given their widespread use. In particular, the emerging scenarios and the
likely trends for the future of critical networked systems make the security of those systems a
paramount concern, especially in the area of controlling access to the critical elements of the
system over communication networks; successful cyber-attacks on such systems, in a worst-case
scenario, could result in loss of life, or in massive financial losses through loss of data, actual
physical destruction, misuse, or theft.
Access control is a cornerstone of network security. In a modern networked system, access
control is implemented through a variety of devices and mechanisms that include, but are not lim-
ited to, router-based dedicated firewalls; host-based firewalls, which could be based in software or
hardware; operating-system-based mechanisms, such as the mandatory access control in the Na-
tional Security Agency’s (NSA’s) SELinux; and middleware-based mechanisms, such as the Java
Security Manager. Such devices and mechanisms collectively implement a networked system’s
global policy (which is usually implicit), which specifies the overall system-level objectives with
respect to resource access. However, it has been shown in empirical studies that misconfiguration
of access control enforcement points is common. The problem of identifying those misconfig-
urations is compounded when several such mechanisms are present, as the complex interactions
among those distributed and layered mechanisms can mask problems and lead to subtle errors.
In this dissertation, we propose a framework for performing comprehensive security analysis
of an automatically obtained snapshot of an access control policy implementation (e.g., firewall
rule-sets) to check for compliance against a (potentially partial) specification of the global access
policy. We identify and classify possible errors that can be found in global policy implementations,
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including both policy violations and internal inconsistencies. We provide detailed formalisms that
can be used to efficiently model the topology of the networked system being analyzed and the
rule-sets from multiple types and makes of firewalls that may be present on the network. The
formalisms are XML-based, with sound mathematical underpinnings. We present an XML-based
global policy specification language, with algorithms that ensure internal consistency of specifica-
tions written in that language and resolve any conflicts. We show that our specification language
is at least as expressive as linear temporal logic.
We describe an efficient algorithm for exhaustive analysis to identify all the inconsistencies and
policy violations. The analysis algorithm utilizes specialized data structures, that we call multi-
layered rule-graphs, to dramatically improve performance. We provide additional mechanisms for
identifying the root causes of any problems discovered. We further enhance the scalability of our
analysis by presenting an algorithm for statistical analysis of the networked system; the algorithm
uses importance sampling, and produces a sample set of violations and a quantitative estimate of
the remainder.
To facilitate the analysis, our framework includes techniques that automatically infer the net-
work topology for the system being analyzed based simply on the firewall rule-sets implemented.
The framework has been implemented with a sophisticated graphical front-end as the Network
Access Policy Tool (NetAPT). We demonstrate the efficiency, scalability, and extensibility of our
techniques through analytic evaluation and empirical evidence based on real-world testing. We
also present an algorithm for automatically generating a benchmark suite for testing NetAPT; the
algorithm learns the defining characteristics of our real-world data sets and generates random net-
works and firewall rule-sets that are representative of the real-world ones.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Networked systems are used in a large number of settings, including many critical infrastructure
systems, such as chemical plants, electric power generation and distribution facilities, water distri-
bution networks, and waste water treatment facilities. The emerging scenarios and the likely trends
for the future of critical networked systems demand that the problem of securing these systems re-
ceive immediate attention, especially in the area of controlling access to the critical elements of the
system over communication networks. Given the mission-critical nature of a significant number of
large networked information systems, it is extremely important to ensure their protection against
cyber-attacks, which, in a worst-case scenario, could result in loss of life, or in massive financial
losses through loss of data, actual physical destruction, misuse, or theft.
A modern networked system includes a variety of devices and mechanisms for controlling ac-
cess to its resources. These access control mechanisms include, but are not limited to, router-
based dedicated firewalls; host-based firewalls, which could be based in software or hardware;
operating-system-based mechanisms, such as the mandatory access control in the National Secu-
rity Agency’s (NSA’s) SELinux; and middleware-based mechanisms, such as the Java Security
Manager, that provide for specification and enforcement of fine-granularity access control policies
for Java programs.
The importance of correctly implementing access control for effective intrusion prevention can-
not be overestimated. A survey of the SANS Institute’s top 20 vulnerabilities [1] shows that a
significant number of them are defended against by appropriate configurations of access control
policy. To defend systems against the most critical known threats, one has to be able to validate se-
curity policy implementation. However, distributed and layered mechanisms, such as those listed
above, can interact in complex ways that can lead to subtle errors and mask problems. It can be
difficult to discern the global picture that emerges from the local configurations of these myriad ac-
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cess control elements. As a result, it is not surprising that misconfigurations of these mechanisms
are a major source of security vulnerabilities. In fact, a study in 2004 suggested that most firewalls
(the most popular access control mechanism) suffer from misconfigurations [2]. It is important for
the administrators of computer networks to have ways to make sure that high-level specifications
of such system access constraints are reflected in the actual configurations of the access control
mechanisms spread throughout the system. Furthermore, if the implementation of policy (device
configurations) is not in compliance with the specification, a diagnosis to locate the root causes of
the problem is critical.
This dissertation describes a framework and a set of constituent techniques to address the needs
described above. Our techniques allow for the analysis of the security policy implementation for
conformance with the global security policy specification. They integrate policy rules (i.e., con-
figuration information) from a large variety of sources typically found in a modern network and
provide for a detailed offline analysis, as well as dynamic online analysis of incremental config-
uration changes that allows for detection of policy implementation holes during operation. They
ensure scalability with increasing network size and complexity via a statistical analysis mode. We
have implemented the framework in the form of a tool, the Network Access Policy Tool (NetAPT),
which includes a graphical front-end for usability and ease of information management.
1.1 Thesis Statement
It is difficult to meet best-practices recommendations and compliance requirement rigorously by
hand without significant person-hour investment. There exists a need for methods that can express
best practices and compliance requirements for large networked systems as global access policy
in a machine-checkable form. Furthermore, we need techniques that can automatically detect and
identify violations of the global access policy by its implementation (in the form of configuration
of firewalls and other access policy enforcement devices).
It is our thesis that:
• Access control policy implementation in networked systems can be verified for compliance
against a (potentially partial) specification of the global access policy.
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• Mechanisms for such verification can be demonstrably efficient, scalable and extensible, and
require minimal user guidance.
• Those mechanisms can be of use to real system administrators and auditors by helping them
identify security problems that would otherwise be difficult to detect without a considerable
time investment.
1.2 Contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
• A classification of the possible errors that can be found in global policy implementations.
This includes errors leading to policy violations and/or internal rule-set inconsistencies.
• An XML-based global policy specification language with mechanisms for direct transcrip-
tion as well as translation from other formalisms, such as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and
GUI-based specifications. We provide algorithms for ensuring internal consistency of the
specification and resolution of any conflicts. We prove that our specification language is at
least as expressive as LTL.
• A unified XML-based schema for representing rule-sets from multiple types and makes of
firewalls. We currently support nearly full feature-sets of the devices from the four most
popular commercial firewall manufacturers.
• A multi-layered rule-graph data structure for efficient modeling of network topology and
the accompanying access policy implementation. We use multidimensional interval trees
(continuous elements) and hash-tables (discrete elements) to represent rule-graphs, policy
constraints, and traffic attribute sets.
• An efficient algorithm for exhaustive analysis that produces a complete list of inconsistencies
and policy violations. We provide additional mechanisms for identifying the root causes of
the reported violations.
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• An algorithm for statistical analysis of the networked system, which produces a sample set
of violations and a quantitative estimate of the remainder.
• A method for automatically inferring the network topology from the configuration of the
layer 3 devices (firewalls, routers, and switches).
• An implementation of the proposed framework in the form of the Network Access Policy
Tool (NetAPT). The tool provides a high-functionality GUI as well as a powerful command-
line interface. It incorporates implemented policy rules from a wide variety of sources,
and, through extensive automation, minimizes the need for user guidance. It has been used
successfully at several real-world sites.
• A method for learning the defining characteristics of a set of network topologies and the
rule-sets of the firewalls therein, and use them to generate random networks and firewall
rule-sets that are similar. The generated networks can be varied along dimensions such as
numbers of sub-networks, access control devices, hosts, applications deployed, and rule-set
size and complexity. We use the randomly generated networks to provide comprehensive
experimental results demonstrating the efficacy and scalability of our analysis and topology-
inference algorithms. The experimental results supplement the analytic evaluation of those
algorithms.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 begins with some background information on how access control is implemented in
modern networked systems. We then provide a detailed and comprehensive classification of possi-
ble errors that can be found when implementing access control through firewalls. We include both
errors due to internal inconsistencies in the firewalls’ rule-sets and errors resulting from violations
of the user-specified global policy.
Chapter 3 presents the state of the art of the research in related areas, particularly policy spec-
ification and identification of misconfigurations in firewalls. We look at academic research and
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several commercial products. We critically examine the prior art and identify the key challenges
that still need to be addressed in order to satisfy our thesis statement.
Chapter 4 introduces the formalisms and data structures that we use to develop efficient analysis
algorithms. We provide formalisms for global access policy specification, access control elements,
and network topology. We describe the multilayered rule-graph data structure that we use to model
the network topology and access control elements (firewall rule-sets). We detail mechanisms for
efficient traversal of the rule-graph data structure using multidimensional interval trees. We con-
clude the chapter with a comparison of our policy specification language and LTL, proving that
our specification language is at least as expressive as LTL.
Chapter 5 details our algorithms for efficient, exhaustive analysis of a given network system
(topology and rule-sets) for compliance with a user-specified global access policy. We formally
describe an algorithm for identifying all the internal inconsistencies in the rule-sets, an algorithm
for identifying all the paths through the network that violate some tenets of the global access
policy, and, finally, algorithms for identifying the root causes that result in all the violating paths.
We conclude with an analytic evaluation (complexity analysis) of the algorithms described in the
chapter.
Chapter 6 details importance sampling-based algorithms for statistical analysis for checking
compliance. We provide descriptions of the required metrics and mathematical formulation to
support the use of importance sampling. We also outline an algorithm for determining the likeli-
hood of there being no violations if none are found when some stopping criterion is reached.
Chapter 7 describes the techniques we use for inferring the network topology from the config-
uration files of the firewalls and layer 3 devices (such as routers and switches). We highlight the
ways in which we have made major extensions to an existing inference framework to implement
our techniques. We describe the inference algorithms in detail in Appendix A.
Chapter 8 details the implementation of our framework in the form of the Network Access
Policy Tool (NetAPT). We describe the tool architecture and highlight some of the tool’s essential
features.
Chapter 9 details experimental evaluation of our algorithms. We evaluate NetAPT on test cases
drawn from various industry collaborations, and demonstrate that our algorithms are efficient and
provide results that can easily be used by system administrators to identify and correct any prob-
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lems with the configurations of their firewalls. We also detail a mechanism for generating a bench-
mark suite of automatically generated network topologies and firewall rule-sets that share essential
characteristics with the data set obtained through industry collaboration.
Finally, Chapter 10 concludes with a summary of our contributions and brief discussion of future
avenues for research.
6
CHAPTER 2
ACCESS CONTROL IN NETWORKS
Access control has long been the linchpin of system security; modern systems have multiple access
control methodologies, different security models, and separate configurations for each methodol-
ogy and each device. Together these all form the access control implementation. However, only
very limited technology exists to answer crucial questions about precisely what security posture is
produced, how the different access control policies interact, and whether the implementation is in
compliance with an overall statement of global access control policy, among others.
To better appreciate the issue, let’s examine some of the access control components of a dis-
tributed system. Firewalls are critical assets in the protection of a network. A firewall is configured
through its rules (collectively referred to as a rule-set), which it can use to shape the traffic that
crosses it. A firewall matches the incident network traffic against its rules, using traffic character-
istics such as the source of origin, intended destination, and communication protocol, and either
forbids or allows the traffic to pass through depending on the action indicated by the matching
rule. A typical setting usually contains a distributed firewall implementation, wherein traffic may
need to pass through more than one firewall to transit the network. Firewalls can be used to divide
the network into secure zones that limit user and application access between zones. For exam-
ple, Figure 2.1 shows a real-life network we have studied, developed as part of a large Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) project, which is composed of multiple network
zones (in boxes) isolated by devices that enforce access control policy. Of particular interest is the
fact that there are eight separate zones and over 50 different policy enforcement devices (including
SELinux on some of the hosts).
Most companies configure firewalls with a “deny all, permit none” setting with a few exceptions.
However, in reality, there are no generic rules that fit all situations, and the specific architecture of
the system (e.g., the use of demilitarized zones (DMZ)) dictates how the rules should be configured
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Figure 2.1: Representative Network
for effective security at a particular site. Firewalls may further support “stateful” rules that keep
track of roles in a TCP/IP session and only allow traffic that is consistent with the past history of
the session indicated in the network packet. In addition, firewalls may provide network address
translation (NAT), which creates a mapping between the IP addresses and port numbers used in the
interior of the network and a (common) IP address and port number offered to the outside network.
A system can also have host-based firewalls, implemented in either software or hardware.
Software-based firewalls, such as iptables [3] in Linux and several commercial ones available
for Windows, are implemented in the host operating system. Hardware-based firewalls, such as
3Com’s Embedded Firewall (EFW) PCI card [4], are implemented on the network interface card
(NIC) itself, and as a result, those firewalls are tamper-resistant to cyber-attackers who were able
to gain control of the operating system on a host.
There are published guidelines (e.g., the National Infrastructure Security Coordination Center
(NISCC) guide to good practices in firewall deployment [5]) to facilitate the development of unique
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rule-sets for the different firewalls at an operating site, but they are fairly generic and have to be
customized by network system administrators to the specific needs of their sites.
However, access control is more complex than just firewall rules. A finer-grained access control
is provided by mechanisms available on the operating system and middleware levels. They might
include discretionary in-built mechanisms for managing permissions for local objects (such as
files) and privileges of the processes that are present in the default installations of popular operating
systems like Linux and Windows. However, in security-conscious settings, especially for networks
managing critical infrastructure, hardened versions of the traditional operating systems have been
increasingly adopted. These include SELinux [6] (developed by the NSA), which is a secure
version of the Linux operating system. It can be configured using a (large) number of policy files
that can be compiled into the Linux kernel. It makes it possible to restrict the processes on a
machine so that they run within domains that are isolated from each other, with explicit rules in
the policy files governing transition between domains (i.e., change in privilege). It can control
the ability of applications and user classes/roles to access not just file objects, but also network
sockets and other applications. Policies are typically specified using type enforcement and role-
based access control mechanisms. Similar functionality for Windows operating systems can be
provided through third-party software, such as the Cisco Security Agent [7].
An increasing number of handheld and embedded devices that liaison with networked systems
are based on, or at least support, Java. The Java Security Manager provides fine-grained access
control similar to SELinux for the Java Virtual Machine, and adds another avenue for access policy
implementation.
However, access control is more complex than just firewall rules. In security-conscious settings,
hardened versions of traditional operating systems have been adopted. These include SELinux [6]
(developed by the NSA), which is a secure version of the Linux operating system. Similar func-
tionality for Windows operating systems can be provided through third-party software, such as the
Cisco Security Agent [7]. Such software can provide mandatory mechanisms such as role-based
access control, type checking, and multi-level security models. Such tightly controlled access con-
trol is likewise at the heart of the emerging “trusted network” architectures [8], for which a device
must prove to the system that it meets a specification for joining the network. Once admitted, a
device’s access control profile is often driven by role-based access control [9].
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One can use a global policy to specify at a system level the overall objectives with respect to
access control. It specifies both what connectivity between roles and devices is inadmissible, and
what connectivity must be supported. The rules are stated in terms of sets of roles and devices,
rather than individual ones. For example, a rule might read, “An account manager in the sales
network zone must be able to use sftp to forward any file in the Monthly Sales directory to his or
her Reports directory, on the sales server found in the management network zone.” Another rule
could be “Aside from the Library Historian, which may receive SQL updates from the mirrored
Historian within the process control zone, no actor on any host in the DMZ may connect to any
host in the process control zone.” Clearly, multiple access control policies are at play here; it is also
clear that the rules can be stated in a form that allows a program that is analyzing access control
configurations to determine whether the rule is satisfied.
The critical problem this work addresses is that networked systems check only fine-grained
local access policy rules at single devices, not global policy. Global access policy implementations
may or may not comply with global policy requirements. Without a way to check that compliance,
serious security vulnerabilities can and do exist in real implementations of critical systems, causing
them to fail in potentially harmful ways when attacked.
More formally, we now discuss a classification of the problems resulting from misconfigurations
of access control mechanisms, in particular firewalls.
2.1 Policy Violations
Administrators often have high-level policies describing what access to the network should be pro-
hibited (blacklists) or ensured (whitelist). It is crucial that firewall configurations exactly reflect
the security policy. Any nonconforming configurations may result in undesired blocking, unau-
thorized access, or even the potential for an unauthorized person to alter security configurations.
Therefore, a firewall must be verified against the policy.
Although policy definition is specific to individual institutions, the network security community
has some well-understood guidelines on firewall configurations. From an external auditor’s point
of view, Wool [2] studied 37 configurations of the Check Point’s FireWall-1 product and noticed
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12 common firewall configuration errors. For example, 90% if the configurations allowed “any”
destination on outbound rules, and “any” service on inbound rules. Allowing of NetBIOS and
Portmapper/Remote Procedure Call service was another common class of errors that expose the
network to very insecure services. A large number of firewalls were not configured correctly to
provide proper protection. Approximately 46% of the firewalls are not configured with stealth
rules to hide themselves, and over 70% of them were open to insecure management protocols or
external management machines. All such “errors” affect the security of the entire network and
must be carefully checked.
Another source of input for the blacklist is the bogon list [10], which describes IP blocks or port
numbers not currently allocated by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and Regional
Internet Registries (RIRs) plus those reserved for private or special use. Attackers often use these
IP blocks or ports for DoS attacks, spamming, or hacking activities. Most firewall administrators
would want to ensure that traffic to and from these IP blocks and port numbers is neither explicitly
nor implicitly allowed to reach their networks.
2.2 Rule-Set Inconsistencies
Firewall configurations represent the administrators intention, which should be consistent. There-
fore, inconsistencies are often good indicators of misconfigurations. Checking for inconsistencies
is solely based on the configuration files and does not need external input. Inconsistencies happen
at three levels: intra-firewall, inter-firewall, and cross-path.
2.2.1 Intra-Firewall Inconsistencies
1. Shadowing refers to the case where all the packets that one rule intends to deny (or accept)
have been accepted (or denied) by preceding rules. This often reveals a misconfiguration
and is considered an “error.” A rule can be shadowed by one preceding rule that matches
a superset of the packets. In Table 2.1, rule 4 is shadowed by rule 2, because every UDP
packet from 172.16.1.0/24 to 192.168.1.0/24 is accepted by rule 2, which matches any UDP
packets destined for 192.168.1.0/24. Alternatively, a rule may also be shadowed by a set of
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1 deny tcp 10.1.1.0/25 any
2 accept udp any 192.168.1.0/24
3 deny tcp 10.1.1.128/25 any
4 deny udp 172.16.1.0/24 192.168.1.0/24
5 accept tcp 10.1.1.0/24 any
6 deny udp 10.1.1.0/24 192.168.0.0/16
7 accept udp 172.16.1.0/24 any
Table 2.1: Inconsistent Single Access Control List (ACL)
rules collectively. For example, rule 5 is shadowed by the combination of rules 1 and 3. Rule
1 denies TCP packets from 10.1.1.0/25, and rule 3 denies TCP packets from 10.1.1.128/25.
Collectively, they deny all TCP packets from 10.1.1.0/24, which are what rule 5 intends to
accept.
2. Generalization refers to the case where a subset of the packets matched to this rule has been
excluded by preceding rules. It is the reverse of shadowing and happens when a preceding
rule matches a subset of this rule but takes a different action. In Table 2.1, rule 7 is a
generalization of rule 4 because UDP packets from 172.16.1.0/24 and to 192.168.1.0/24
form a subset of UDP packets from 172.16.1.0/24 (rule 7), yet the decision for the former is
different from the latter.
3. Correlation refers to the case where the current rule intersects with preceding rules but
specifies a different action. The predicates of these correlated rules intersect, but are not
related by the superset or subset relations. The decision for packets in the intersection will
rely on the order of the rules. Rules 2 and 6 are correlated with each other. The intersection
of them is “udp 10.1.1.0/24 192.168.1.0/24,” and the preceding rule determines the fate of
these packets.
Generalization and correlation are not necessarily errors, as they are commonly used techniques
for excluding part of a larger set from a certain action. Proper use of these techniques could result in
fewer rules. However, the techniques should be used very consciously. Access control lists (ACLs)
with generalizations or correlations can be ambiguous and difficult to maintain. If a preceding rule
is deleted, the action for some packets in the intersection will change. For a large and evolving list
of rules, it may be difficult to remain aware of all the related generalizations and correlations when
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working manually. Without a priori knowledge about the administrator’s intention, we cannot be
certain of whether they represent misconfigurations. Therefore, we classify them as “warnings.”
2.2.2 Inter-Firewall Inconsistencies
Inconsistencies among different firewalls might not be errors. When a few firewalls are chained
together, a packet has to survive the local filtering actions of all the firewalls on its path to its
destination. Therefore, a downstream firewall can often rely on an upstream firewall to achieve
policy conformance and can be configured more loosely. On the other hand, a downstream firewall
at the inner perimeter often needs a tighter security policy. Without input from the administrator,
the only inter-firewall inconsistency that can be classified as an “error” is shadowed accept rules.
By explicitly allowing certain predicates, we infer that the administrator intends to receive the
relevant packets.
2.2.3 Cross-Path Inconsistencies
As discussed earlier, multiple data paths could exit from the Internet to the same protected net-
work. Cross-path inconsistency refers to the case where some packets denied on one path are
accepted through another path. Depending on the underlying routing table, these anomalies may
be exploitable. However, attacks that affect routing protocols do exist and an attacker only needs
to succeed once. Cross-path inconsistencies may also be indicated by intermittently disrupted ser-
vices. Routing changes may necessitate that the packets originally reaching a network switch over
to another path, but the firewall rules on the new path may deny such packets. Furthermore, the
second path may not always be available since the actual path is determined by the underlying
routing protocol. However, routing is designed to be adaptive to link failures and heavy load. In
addition, it is relatively easy to inject false routing messages [11]. A safe firewall configuration
should not rely on dynamic routing constraints, and should assume that all paths are topologically
possible.
Checking cross-path inconsistencies through active testing is very difficult. It may disrupt the
production network since routing tables must be altered to test different scenarios. Manual auditing
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1 accept tcp 192.168.1.1/32 172.16.1.1/32
2 accept tcp 10.0.0.0/8 any
3 accept tcp 10.2.1.0/24 any
4 deny tcp any any
5 deny udp 10.1.1.0/26 any
6 deny udp 10.1.1.64/26 any
7 deny udp 10.1.1.128/26 any
8 deny udp 10.1.1.192/26 any
9 deny udp any
Table 2.2: Single ACL with Redundant Rules
of such anomalies is also difficult. Even for a network of moderate size, the number of possible
paths between two nodes can be large.
2.3 Rule-Set Redundancy
A firewall needs to inspect a huge number of packets. Therefore, it is difficult not to be concerned
with firewall efficiency. A lot of work has been dedicated to improving firewall speed through
better hardware and software designs and implementations. To administrators, the most practical
way to improve firewall efficiency is through better configuration of the firewall. An efficient
firewall configuration should require the minimum possible number of rules, use the least possible
amount of memory, and incur the least possible amount of computational load while achieving
the filtering goals. Although inefficiency does not directly expose a vulnerability, a faster and
more efficient firewall will encourage firewall deployment and therefore make the network safer.
In addition, the efficiency of a firewall can determine a network’s responsiveness to Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks.
Redundancy refers to the case where if a rule is removed, the firewall does not change its action
on any packets. Reducing redundancy can reduce the total number of rules, and consequently
reduce memory consumption and packet classification time [12].
A rule can be considered redundant if the preceding rules have matched a superset of it and
specified the same action. For example, in Table 2.2, rule 3 is redundant because rule 2 has already
specified the same action for all packets that match rule 3. A rule can also be made redundant by
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the subsequent rules. Rules 5, 6, 7 and 8 are all redundant because if we remove them, the packets
they would have denied are still going to be denied by rule 9. In fact, for firewalls with a “deny
all” policy implicitly appended to the end of each ACL, we do not need rules 4 through 9 at all.
Redundant accept or deny rules are “errors” within the same firewall. However, that is not the
case for distributed firewalls. A packet must be accepted on all the firewalls on its path to reach
its destination. Redundant accept rules on different firewalls are usually necessary. Redundant
deny rules on different firewalls are unnecessary, but are often considered good practice to en-
hance security, as this redundancy provides an additional line of defense if the outer perimeter is
compromised.
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CHAPTER 3
RELATED WORK
The complexity of implementing an access control policy through configuration of a large number
of distributed devices and the risk of conflicts among these devices have spawned a significant
amount of work. We can divide the prior art into several categories.
3.1 Analyzing Rule-Sets for Consistency
These efforts focused on analyzing an existing configuration of one or more access control devices
for internal consistency.
3.1.1 Single Firewall Consistency
The majority of work in this area has focused on internal consistency among the rules of a single
firewall [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. Most of this work used variations of rectangular set operations for
fast analysis. However, as noted, these approaches are limited to the rule-sets of a single firewall,
have no formal error model for the issues that can exist in rule-sets, and do not attempt to check
for conformance with any sort of global policy specification.
3.1.2 Inter-Firewall Consistency Analysis
A conflict detection tool for distributed firewall systems has been described in [19], but it only
checks for certain kinds of syntactic errors, such as overlapping rules, and not for semantic errors
with respect to a specification of the intent. The Fireman tool, proposed in [20], uses binary deci-
sion diagrams (BDDs) to check for misconfigurations and inconsistencies in one or more firewalls.
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The tool is query-based, being able to indicate only whether a path about which the user has specif-
ically inquired is allowed by the rule-sets. It is unable to provide a complete list of violations of a
user-specified global policy. Xie et al. [21, 22, 23, 24] have outlined a limited fault model for fire-
wall rule-set inconsistencies and described ways to automatically suggest corrections when errors
are found. Again, they do not identify violations of a user-specified global policy. Furthermore,
none of the work takes into account the collective fine-grained access control provided by the
network-based mechanisms (e.g., firewalls) and host-based mechanisms (e.g., SELinux policies).
Also, none of the above work has been applied to and optimized for specific classes of networks.
Those efforts did not answer the need for ways to model and analyze distributed networks of
firewalls, checking for both internal consistency and compliance with policy specification.
3.2 Top-Down Management
Another vector of research effort has focused on automatic generation of consistent policy imple-
mentation (at devices) from formal descriptions of global policy [25, 26]. Cisco provides Cis-
coWorks [27], a suite of products that enable top-down firewall policy management that includes
configuration management, a policy manager that generates policies from high-level specifica-
tions, and log/audit analysis. Those are appropriate for new, vendor-homogeneous systems, but
do not address existing implementations or heterogeneous systems. Furthermore, they require
specification of detailed and exhaustive global security policy. For most current network system
administrators, the ability to check existing configurations against policy specifications that indi-
cate intended high-level behavior would likely be more useful.
Those efforts did not fill the need for mechanisms that support modeling and analysis of a wide
variety of sources for access control rule-sets.
3.3 Attack Graphs
The problem of checking implementation against specification is also known as “model check-
ing” [28]. This line of research has a rich history in the context of proving the correctness of both
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hardware and software. The key abstraction is a finite-state machine, and the key problem is that
the size of the state space explodes with the complexity of the system. As we consider integration
of higher layers of access control mechanisms, the finite state machine view may be appropriate for
them. However, while it is possible to map network access control into a classical model-checking
framework, we aren’t convinced of the value of doing so. Much of the attention in model-checking
is paid to compact representation of the state space; we already have a representation of the prob-
lem (i.e., the rule-graph, to be described), which is a graph whose number of nodes is linear in the
number of rules. Furthermore, our analysis takes advantage of the problem domain rather than a
general state space, with an approach that lends itself naturally to optimizations for scalability.
3.3.1 Without Statistical Analysis
The research on “attack graphs” is of some relevance to the scalability issue, particularly those
research efforts are compared to the statistical analysis that we have developed. Those research
efforts have largely been an application of model-checking. Ritchey and Ammann [29] use model
checking to identify a single violating path in an attack graph. Sheyner et al. [30] provide a more
comprehensive analysis, but it suffers from the state-space explosion problem, since the entire
attack graph needs to be analyzed to provide the relevant metrics, thereby severely limiting the
scalability.
3.3.2 With Statistical Analysis
Ou et al. [31, 32] have used a prolog-based approach, rather than the traditional model-checking,
for attack graph generation and analysis; however, their solution does not seem to be able to
scale to large networks that are also deep (i.e., graphs with potentially long paths), or to calculate
generic metrics that are functions of paths rather than edges in the graph. Our approach includes
a statistical analysis component for improved scalability when analyzing large networks, which
builds and expands on the mathematical techniques we first developed for model-based penetration
testing [33].
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3.4 Policy Specification and Composition
As we have indicated, a comprehensive mechanism for analyzing access control policy imple-
mentations would include checking for compliance against a user-specified high-level policy that
describes the intended behavior. Hence, there’s a need to choose or develop a means for writing
the said global policy specification.
3.4.1 Authorization Policy Specification Languages
There is considerable academic and industrial interest in XACML (eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language) [34], a core XML schema for representing authorization and entitlement poli-
cies, which is an open standard developed and promoted by the Oasis XACML Technical Com-
mittee. Other researchers are exploring problems such as mapping into XACML of simple and
intuitive global policy languages for which policies have been verified, combining XACML and
SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) to support distributed authorization [35], and anal-
ysis of the impact on the global policy stance of (even small) changes in an XACML policy.
RCL2000 [36] is a specification language for role-based authorization constraints. It can be
used to express prohibition and obligation constraints. Ponder [37] is a language for specifying
management and security policies for distributed systems.
All of the above specification languages are similar in expressive power and largely inter-
convertible. They have the added benefit of being human-readable. However, the descriptions
involved can be highly verbose, and any formal reasoning on the specifications can be difficult and
inefficient.
3.4.2 Logics
These include first-order predicate logic, and the temporal logics: Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [38]
and Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [39]. They are widely used as the specification languages
for various model-checking tools. The specifications in these logics can be compact, lend them-
selves to efficient evaluation, and facilitate analytical reasoning. However, they can be difficult
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for non-experts to write and comprehend. Furthermore, while first-order predicate logic may be
insufficient, full temporal logics may be an overkill for most access control policies.
The above literature on specification formalisms did not fill the need for a formalism that can
be used to write human-readable specifications but still provide a clear mapping to a formal math-
ematical system.
3.5 Other Commercial Tools
Vendor-neutral tools have recently appeared that consider access control in a distributed system.
They include the Skybox firewall compliance auditor [40] and Red Seal SRM [41]. Both tools
use network topology and routing information to determine potential network flows. Red Seal
SRM uses vulnerability databases and specification of software running on hosts to compute risk
measures, while Skybox determines when firewall rules allow violation of a more abstractly stated
global policy. In comparison, our approach incorporates sophisticated statistical analysis for highly
improved scalability and also naturally admits integration of higher-level layers of access control
policy (e.g., SELinux policies, and/or role-based access in trusted networks).
Among other related commercial products are Netflow and Peakflow [42] (from Arbor Net-
works), which are tools for network management and run-time anomaly detection, and focus on
alert aggregation, correlation, and traffic visualization. They are event-driven and do not detect
problems with the security configuration itself. That is, they perform failure detection as opposed
to fault detection as they are able to detect vulnerabilities resulting from misconfigurations only
when those vulnerabilities result in actual exploits.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
4.1 Analysis Framework: Formalisms
In this section, we introduce a formal framework for reasoning about and evaluating the confor-
mance of access control implementation with a specification of the policy in networked systems.
4.1.1 Formalisms for Global Access Policy
Our formalism for specifying the global access policy is an XML-based specification language
inspired by XACML. The XML schema for the language is shown in Figure 4.1. We will describe
formalisms as applied to network layer access control.
Definition 1. A network traffic terminus is a tuple (A,P,S).
• A is a set of disjoint IP addresses {a1,a2, · · · ,an}.
• P is a (layer 3) network protocol.
• S is a set of port numbers or other protocol-specific identifiers (e.g., ICMP message type if
P = ICMP), {s1,s2, · · · ,sn}.
V is the set of all possible network traffic terminuses.
Definition 2. A constraint is used to indicate how a particular traffic flow is to be treated. It is
defined as the tuple ψ = (V s,V d,λ ,ω).
• The first two parameters (V s,V d ∈V ) are the source and destination terminuses respectively.
• λ ∈ {auth,nonauth,any} indicates if the constraint is applicable to authenticated traffic.
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<?xml version=’1.0’ encoding=’us-ascii’?> 1
2
<!DOCTYPE PolicySet [ 3
4
<!ELEMENT PolicySet (NetworkGroup*, ServiceGroup*, ICMPGroup*, 5
ProtocolGroup*, Policy*)> 6
7
<!ELEMENT NetworkGroup (Description, AddressBlock+)> 8
<!ATTLIST NetworkGroup name CDATA #REQUIRED> 9
<!ELEMENT AddressBlock EMPTY> 10
<!ATTLIST AddressBlock NetAddress CDATA #REQUIRED> 11
<!ATTLIST AddressBlock NetMask CDATA #REQUIRED> 12
13
<!ELEMENT ServiceGroup (Description, PortRange+)> 14
<!ATTLIST ServiceGroup name CDATA #REQUIRED> 15
<!ELEMENT PortRange EMPTY> 16
<!ATTLIST PortRange protocol CDATA #REQUIRED> 17
<!ATTLIST PortRange beginPort CDATA #REQUIRED> 18
<!ATTLIST PortRange endPort CDATA #REQUIRED> 19
20
<!ELEMENT ICMPGroup (Description, ICMPType+)> 21
<!ATTLIST ICMPGroup name CDATA #REQUIRED> 22
<!ELEMENT ICMPType EMPTY> 23
<!ATTLIST ICMPType type CDATA #REQUIRED> 24
25
<!ELEMENT ProtocolGroup (Description, ProtocolID+)> 26
<!ATTLIST ProtocolGroup name CDATA #REQUIRED> 27
<!ELEMENT ProtocolID EMPTY> 28
<!ATTLIST ProtocolID protocol CDATA #REQUIRED> 29
30
<!ELEMENT Policy (Constraint*)> 31
<!ATTLIST Policy name CDATA #REQUIRED> 32
<!ELEMENT Constraint EMPTY> 33
<!ATTLIST Constraint name CDATA #REQUIRED> 34
<!ATTLIST Constraint nodeRef CDATA #REQUIRED> 35
<!ATTLIST Constraint type CDATA #REQUIRED> 36
<!ATTLIST Constraint direction CDATA #REQUIRED> 37
<!ATTLIST Constraint sourceIP CDATA #REQUIRED> 38
<!ATTLIST Constraint sourceMask CDATA #REQUIRED> 39
<!ATTLIST Constraint sourcePortRange CDATA #REQUIRED> 40
<!ATTLIST Constraint destinationPortRange CDATA #REQUIRED> 41
<!ATTLIST Constraint ipProtocol CDATA #REQUIRED> 42
<!ATTLIST Constraint description CDATA #REQUIRED> 43
<!ATTLIST Constraint authenticatedTraffic (true | false) #REQUIRED> 44
<!ATTLIST Constraint users CDATA ’N/A’> 45
<!ATTLIST Constraint roles CDATA ’N/A’> 46
<!ATTLIST Constraint domains CDATA ’N/A’> 47
48
<!ELEMENT Description (#PCDATA)> 49
]> 50
Figure 4.1: Global Access Policy Document Type Definition (DTD)
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• ω is the type or action of the constraint. It can take a value from the set {allowexact , allowmin,
deny}.
– allowexact indicates that a path must exist between the two terminuses.
– allowmin indicates that a path can exist between the two terminuses. This type of con-
straint is used to refine broader deny constraints, to facilitate compactness of specifi-
cation. This would become clearer as we describe the implicit deny constraint and the
principle of greatest specificity below.
– deny indicates that a path must not exist between the two terminuses.
Ψexplicit = {ψ1,ψ2, · · · ,ψn} is the set of all explicitly defined constraints.
Definition 3. An implicit deny constraint exists for each policy, and is defined to be ψimplicit .
ψimplicit = (V sallow,V dallow,any,deny).
• V sallow =
⋃
(V s,V d ,λ ,ω)∈Ψexplicit ,s.t.ω∈{allowexact ,allowmin}V
s. We define the union of the termi-
nuses as the terminus formed by the union of the corresponding elements (sets themselves)
in their tuples.
• V sdeny =
⋃
(V s,V d ,λ ,ω)∈Ψexplicit ,s.t.ω∈{allowexact ,allowmin}V
d . We define the union of the terminuses
as the terminus formed by the union of the corresponding elements (sets themselves) in their
tuples.
The constraint ψimplicit indicates that unless refined by other constraints in the policy, all traffic
between any two terminuses mentioned in the other allow-type constraints is denied. This allows
us to define compact policy specifications using just a collection of (mostly) allowmin constraints
to describe accepted (but not necessary) behavior, denying everything else.
Definition 4. A conditionally composed constraint, ψ = ψ1|ψ2 is composed of the constraints ψ1
and ψ2. It indicates that the constraint ψ1 is applicable only if the constraint ψ2 is true for a traffic
flow. The constraint is considered to be met if ψ2 is not true.
Conditionally composed constraints are useful for modeling stateful firewalls, flows with multi-
ple sessions and encapsulated traffic.
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Definition 5. A global access policy specification, Π, is an ordered pair (Σ,Ψ).
• Σ is a set of variable definitions for various network and traffic elements, including IP ad-
dress blocks, network protocols, and services (ports).
• Ψ (= {ψ1,ψ2, · · · ,ψn,ψimplicit}) is a set of policy constraints defined on the elements of Σ.
It is possible for a flow to have multiple rules apply to it, and have conflicts in the rule outcomes.
Coupled with a good conflict resolution mechanism, that is actually quite a useful tool for compact
specification of desired policy. For example, imagine that an installation wants to follow the best-
practice recommendation that has traffic from the control network and from the corporate network
terminate in the DMZ, except for one specific application for which a host named control-database
in the control network must be able to upload data to a host named corporate-database in the
corporate network. That goal would be accomplished through the creation of two constraints. The
first would implement the recommendation as we have already described; this is a “deny” rule.
The second would be a “permit” rule that names control-database and the specific port used as
the source set, names corporate-database and the specific port used as the destination set, binds
the constraint to control-database, makes the direction “outgoing,” and names the protocol (e.g.,
TCP) used to carry the connection. The union of these two rules does what we want, so long as the
conflict resolution mechanisms applies the second rule to the specific flow of interest, and applies
the first rule to all other flows coming out of the control network.
We resolve rule conflicts using the principle of greatest specificity. This principle, well-known to
system administrators who manage routers, is that if there are multiple forwarding rules that apply
to the destination of an incoming packet, the rule with the largest number of significant prefix
bits (“longest prefix”) is the one chosen. Applied to our context, a rule that in all ways is more
narrowly applicable to sources, destinations, and protocols than another ought to take precedence
over it, because it is more specific in all of its descriptive details. Clearly that is exactly the case in
the example described in the previous paragraph.
Definition 6. Let V = (A,P,S) and V ′ = (A′,P′,S′) be two network traffic terminuses, such that
V,V ′ ∈ V . We say,
• V ⊆V ′ if A⊆ A′, P⊆ P′ and S⊆ S′;
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• V ⊂V ′ if at least one of the above inclusions is strict.
The principle of greatest specificity is stated as follows.
Definition 7. Let ψ1 = (Vs,Vd,λ ,ω) and ψ2 = (Vs′,Vd ′,λ ′,ω ′) be two global policy constraints,
where Vs,Vd,Vs′,Vd ′ ∈V , λ ,λ ′ ∈Λ, and ω,ω ′ ∈Ω. ψ2 is more specific than ψ1 if Vs⊂Vs′, Vd ⊂Vd ′
and λ = λ ′. In such a case, for any traffic flow to which both ψ1 and ψ2 apply, action ω ′ is taken.
The principle of greatest specificity implies that if there is a flow for which multiple constraints
apply, and among these constraints there is one (say ψ) that is more specific in all particulars
than every other constraint in that policy set, then the conflicts are resolved and constraint ψ is
applied. The principle of greatest specificity will not resolve all conflicts; if a global policy has
unresolved conflicts then the user needs to know what those conflicts are and the characteristics of
the traffic flows that are governed by conflicting constraints. The algorithm in Figure 4.2 performs
that consistency check, allowing one to define a consistent set of constraints prior to performing
an analysis that checks the implementation against the policy.
4.1.2 Formalisms for Access Control Elements
Our goal is to analyze complex networked systems with multiple networks, each containing one
or more hosts, connected via various network layer 3 devices (routers/switches), where the access
is controlled through firewalls (or similar devices). We also take into consideration any virtual
overlays that may be present, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Our model of the network
topology that can be analyzed is represented by the XML schema shown in Figure 4.3. To briefly
summarize the representation, all the hosts, networks, access control devices (firewalls), layer 3
routing devices (switches), and overlays (tunnels) are enumerated. Each host stores references
to the network(s) to which it belongs; each firewall or switch stores references to the networks
it bridges (and information on how it bridges them); and each tunnel stores references to its end
points. Some other, more specific, details are stored as well, as shown in the figure.
Firewalls from different vendors may vary significantly in terms of configuration languages, rule
organizations, and interaction between lists or chains. However, a firewall generally consists of a
few interfaces and can be configured with several access control lists (ACLs). Both the ingress
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procedure resolve-constraint-conflict
Ψ←{ψ1, · · · ,ψn} # set of constraints in the policy
C← /0 # set of conflicting constraints
for all ψi ∈ {ψ1, · · · ,ψn−1} do
for all ψ j ∈ {ψi+1, · · · ,ψn} do
(V si,V di,λi,ωi)← ψi; (V s j,V d j,λ j,ω j)← ψ j
if V si∩V s j 6= /0 and V di∩V d j 6= /0 and ωi 6= ω j then
resolution1← subset (V si,V s j)+ subset (V di,V d j)
# subset(x,y) returns 1 if x⊂ y, 2 if x = y, and 0 otherwise
resolution2← 0
if resolution1 ≤ 1 or resolution1 ≥ 4 then
resolution2← subset (V si,V s j)+ subset (V di,V d j)
if resolution1 ≤ 1 or resolution1 ≥ 4 then
C←C∪ (ψi,ψ j)
end if
end if
end if
end for
end for
if C 6= /0 then
return C
end if
end procedure
Figure 4.2: Algorithm for Resolving Policy Constraints
and egress of an interface can be associated with ACLs. If an ACL is associated with the ingress,
filtering is performed when packets arrive at the interface. Similarly, if an ACL is associated with
the egress, filtering will be performed before packets leave the interface. Each ACL consists of a
list of rules. Individual rules can be interpreted in the form < P,action >, where P is a predicate
describes what packets are matched by this rule and action describing the corresponding action
performed on the matched packets. Packets not matched by the current rule will be forwarded to
the next rule until a match is found or the end of the ACL is reached. At the end of an ACL, the
default action will be applied. This is similar to an “if-elsif-else” construct in most programming
languages. Implicit rules vary on different firewall products. On the Cisco PIX firewall and routers,
the implicit rule at the end of an ACL denies everything. On Linux Netfilter, the implicit rule is
defined by the policy of the chain.
Note that so far, we have described the so-called “first-matching” ACLs. Some firewalls, e.g.
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?> 1
<!DOCTYPE Topology [ 2
<!ELEMENT Topology (Network*, Host*, Switch*, Firewall*, Tunnel*)> 3
<!ATTLIST Topology isEncrypted (true|false) #REQUIRED> 4
5
<!ELEMENT Network (Description)> 6
<!ATTLIST Network name CDATA #REQUIRED> 7
<!ATTLIST Network isCompletelyConnected (true|false) #REQUIRED> 8
<!ATTLIST Network netAddress CDATA #REQUIRED> 9
<!ATTLIST Network netMask CDATA #REQUIRED> 10
11
<!ELEMENT Host (Description, IPAddress+, NodeRef*)> 12
<!ATTLIST Host name CDATA #REQUIRED> 13
<!ATTLIST Host accessParameters CDATA #REQUIRED> 14
15
<!ELEMENT Switch (Description, IPAddress, NodeRef*)> 16
<!ATTLIST Switch name CDATA #REQUIRED> 17
18
<!ELEMENT Firewall (Description, IPAddress+, NodeRef*)> 19
<!ATTLIST Firewall name CDATA #REQUIRED> 20
<!ATTLIST Firewall accessParameters CDATA #REQUIRED> 21
<!ATTLIST Firewall NAT CDATA #REQUIRED> 22
23
<!ELEMENT NodeRef EMPTY> 24
<!ATTLIST NodeRef name CDATA #REQUIRED> 25
26
<!ELEMENT IPAddress EMPTY> 27
<!ATTLIST IPAddress ipAddress CDATA #REQUIRED> 28
29
<!ELEMENT Tunnel (Description, IPAddress+, NodeRef+)> 30
<!ATTLIST Tunnel encryption CDATA #IMPLIED> 31
32
<!ELEMENT Description (#PCDATA)> 33
]> 34
Figure 4.3: Network Topology DTD
27
<?xml version=’1.0’ encoding=’us-ascii’?> 1
2
<!DOCTYPE RuleSetCollection [ 3
4
<!ELEMENT RuleSetCollection (RuleSet*)> 5
6
<!ELEMENT RuleSet (Description, IPInterface*, NetworkGroup*, 7
ServiceGroup*, ICMPGroup*, ProtocolGroup*, 8
AccessList*)> 9
<!ATTLIST RuleSet name CDATA #REQUIRED> 10
<!ATTLIST RuleSet fragsAllowed (true | false) #REQUIRED> 11
<!ATTLIST RuleSet nonIPTrafficAllowed (true | false) #REQUIRED> 12
<!ATTLIST RuleSet sniffingAllowed (true | false) #REQUIRED> 13
<!ATTLIST RuleSet spoofingAllowed (true | false) #REQUIRED> 14
<!ATTLIST RuleSet ipOptionAllowed (true | false) #REQUIRED> 15
<!ATTLIST RuleSet testMode (true | false) #REQUIRED> 16
<!ATTLIST RuleSet fallbackMode CDATA #REQUIRED> 17
18
<!ELEMENT IPInterface EMPTY> 19
<!ATTLIST IPInterface name CDATA #REQUIRED> 20
<!ATTLIST IPInterface address CDATA #REQUIRED> 21
<!ATTLIST IPInterface netmask CDATA #REQUIRED> 22
23
<!ELEMENT NetworkGroup (Description, AddressBlock+)> 24
<!ATTLIST NetworkGroup name CDATA #REQUIRED> 25
<!ELEMENT AddressBlock EMPTY> 26
<!ATTLIST AddressBlock NetAddress CDATA #REQUIRED> 27
<!ATTLIST AddressBlock NetMask CDATA #REQUIRED> 28
29
<!ELEMENT ServiceGroup (Description, PortRange+)> 30
<!ATTLIST ServiceGroup name CDATA #REQUIRED> 31
<!ELEMENT PortRange EMPTY> 32
<!ATTLIST PortRange protocol CDATA #REQUIRED> 33
<!ATTLIST PortRange beginPort CDATA #REQUIRED> 34
<!ATTLIST PortRange endPort CDATA #REQUIRED> 35
36
<!ELEMENT ICMPGroup (Description, ICMPType+)> 37
<!ATTLIST ICMPGroup name CDATA #REQUIRED> 38
<!ELEMENT ICMPType EMPTY> 39
<!ATTLIST ICMPType type CDATA #REQUIRED> 40
41
<!ELEMENT ProtocolGroup (Description, ProtocolID+)> 42
<!ATTLIST ProtocolGroup name CDATA #REQUIRED> 43
<!ELEMENT ProtocolID EMPTY> 44
<!ATTLIST ProtocolID protocol CDATA #REQUIRED> 45
Figure 4.4: Access Control Elements DTD: Part 1
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<!ELEMENT AccessList (Description, AuthorizedUsers*, Rule*)> 1
<!ATTLIST AccessList name CDATA #REQUIRED> 2
<!ATTLIST AccessList incomingInterface CDATA #REQUIRED> 3
<!ATTLIST AccessList authenticationACL (true | false) #REQUIRED> 4
5
<!ELEMENT AuthorizedUsers (User*)> 6
<!ATTLIST AuthorizedUsers aaaServerAddress CDATA #REQUIRED> 7
<!ATTLIST AuthorizedUsers aaaServerProtocol CDATA #REQUIRED> 8
9
<!ELEMENT User EMPTY> 10
<!ATTLIST User name CDATA #REQUIRED> 11
12
<!ELEMENT Rule (Description)> 13
<!ATTLIST Rule name CDATA #REQUIRED> 14
<!ATTLIST Rule sourceHostID CDATA #REQUIRED> 15
<!ATTLIST Rule sourcePortRange CDATA #REQUIRED> 16
<!ATTLIST Rule sourceMask CDATA #REQUIRED> 17
<!ATTLIST Rule destinationHostID CDATA #REQUIRED> 18
<!ATTLIST Rule destinationPortRange CDATA #REQUIRED> 19
<!ATTLIST Rule destinationMask CDATA #REQUIRED> 20
<!ATTLIST Rule direction CDATA #REQUIRED> 21
<!ATTLIST Rule action CDATA #REQUIRED> 22
<!ATTLIST Rule ipProtocol CDATA #REQUIRED> 23
<!ATTLIST Rule enabled (true | false) #REQUIRED> 24
<!ATTLIST Rule audit CDATA #REQUIRED> 25
<!ATTLIST Rule testMode (true | false) #REQUIRED> 26
<!ATTLIST Rule ruleNegated (true | false) #REQUIRED> 27
<!ATTLIST Rule allowTcpConnectInit (true | false) #REQUIRED> 28
29
<!ELEMENT Description (#PCDATA)> 30
]> 31
Figure 4.5: Access Control Elements DTD: Part 2
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Figure 4.6: An Example Process Control Network
BSD Packet Filter, use “last-matching” ACLs, in which the decision applied to a packet is deter-
mined by the last matched rule. An ACL using last-matching can be converted to a first-matching
form via re-ordering. In this dissertation, we assume that every ACL uses first-matching. Tradi-
tional stateless firewalls treat each packet in isolation and check every packet against the ACL;
this is computation-intensive and often a performance bottleneck. Modern stateful firewalls can
monitor TCP three-way handshakes and build an entry in the state table. If the firewall matches a
packet to an established flow, it can accept it without checking the ACL, thus significantly reduce
the computation overhead. However, the ACLs still determine whether a state can be established in
the first place. Therefore, the correct configuration of ACLs is important even for stateful firewalls.
Depending on the available “actions” and rule execution logic, we classify firewalls into two
typical models: (1) the simple list model, which is represented by Cisco PIX firewall and router
ACLs, and (2) the complex chain model, which is represented by Linux Netfilter. Firewalls using
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the simple list model allow only accept and deny actions. The complex chain model, in addition to
“accept” and “deny,” also supports calling of another user-defined chain or “return.” We use rule
graphs to model the control flow of ACLs. As can be seen in Section 4.2.2, the rule graph of ACLs
that use the simple list model is just the access control list itself. The rule graphs for ACLs using
the complex chain model are similar to control-flow graphs in programming languages.
In a typical network environment, multiple firewalls are often deployed across the network in
a distributed fashion. Although firewalls are configured independently, a network depends on the
correct configuration of all related firewalls to achieve the desired end-to-end security behavior.
By “end-to-end security behavior,” we refer to the decision on whether a packet should be allowed
to reach a protected network. The packet can be going from one side of a Virtual Private Network
(VPN) to another side of the VPN. It can be going from the untrusted Internet to the trusted secured
intranet.
See Figure 4.6, for example. An enterprise network is connected to the Internet, and the top two
firewalls in the figure are deployed to guard the first Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Services such as
Web and email that must allow public access are more vulnerable (and hence less trustworthy) and
are normally put in the DMZ. Further inside, the internal process control network is guarded by
two additional firewalls (with another DMZ in between). In general, that pair of firewalls will have
a tighter security policy. Important applications and sensitive data often run inside the internal
trusted networks, and only limited accesses are allowed. Since there are multiple paths from the
Internet to the internal network, the filtering action taken depends on the path a packet actually
traverses. Although a packet does not actually choose its data path, the dynamics of the underlying
routing plane may assign different paths for the same set of packets at different times. Ideally,
firewalls should perform consistently regardless of the underlying routing decisions. To guarantee
reachability of desired packets, the administrator must ensure that none of the firewalls on the
path deny them. On the other hand, the administrator must ensure that no potential path allows
prohibited packets to access the protected network.
Definition 8. A rule in an ACL is one of the following,
• < P,accept >: accept the packet
• < P,deny >: deny the packet
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• < P,chainY >: goto ACL chain “Y”
• < P,return >: resume calling chain
where P indicates the predicate characterizing the attributes of the traffic being matched against
the rule.
We have developed an XML-based unified schema, shown in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5, that
provides an intermediate representation for several types and makes of firewalls. We can currently
model rule-sets from Cisco PIX and ASA firewalls, Checkpoint firewalls, SonicWall firewalls, and
Linux iptables. We model an extensive list of features and functionality, including:
• Static and dynamic network address translation (NAT).
• Static routing.
• Authentication, Authorization and Auditing (AAA).
• Virtual Private Networks (VPNs).
• ACL chains.
• Virtual addresses.
4.2 Analysis Framework: Data Structures
4.2.1 Multidimensional Interval Tree
We use multidimensional interval trees [43, 44] to represent the predicate characterizing the traffic
that a particular rule matches. First, we establish a mapping between traffic attribute types and
interval tree dimensions.
Definition 9. A traffic attribute predicate can be characterized as a tuple (S ,D ,Q,P), where
S is a range of source IP addresses, D is a range of destination IP addresses, Q is a layer 3
protocol, andP is a range of network port numbers. The mapping is as follows.
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• S ↔ [x1min,x1max], x1min = minimum address in range, x1max = maximum address in range
• D ↔ [x2min,x2max], x2min = minimum address in range, x2max = maximum address in range
• Q↔ [x3min,x3max], x3min = x3max = protocol number
• P↔ [x4min,x4max], x4min = minimum port number in range, x4max = maximum port number
in range
• Any↔ [ximin,ximax], ximin = Dimin, ximax = Dimax; Dimin and Dimax are the minimum and
maximum possible values of dimension i
Thus, the ACLs we have discussed so far would map to an interval tree node with 4 dimensions.
Using that mapping, we can easily convert any rule predicate into a multidimensional interval tree
node. An interval tree is a binary tree based on the end points of intervals. For example, let X
be a set of intervals in one dimension, and let m be the median of the interval end points. The set
of intervals containing m is stored at the root. The set of intervals to the left or right of m forms
the left or right subtree. These intervals are recursively partitioned based on their median. Search,
insert, and delete operations in a one-dimensional interval tree take O(lgn) time.
A multidimensional interval tree is a straightforward generalization of the one-dimensional in-
terval tree. An interval tree can be initially constructed based on only the intervals in the first
dimension. The resulting first-level interval tree (sometimes referred to as a component tree) con-
tains a set of elements in each tree node. Each node in turn stores its element using an interval
tree based on the second dimension. Any query is reduced to a sequence of binary searches in
each dimension. The multidimensional interval tree data structure implemented in our work is a
dynamic interval tree in the sense that it can support inserts and deletes. Query, insert, and delete
operations take O(n lgd n) time, where d is the number of dimensions.
Similarly to rule predicates, we use multidimensional interval trees to represent network traffic
along a path in the network. The traffic attribute set (TAS) is the data structure used to represent
a collection of packets arriving at any point in the network. Each TAS is a set of 4-tuples, where
each tuple is of the form (source address range, destination address range, protocol number, port
range). We represent each TAS as a 4-dimensional interval tree, similar to the discussion above.
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Figure 4.7: Constructing Rule Graphs
In the subsequent sections, whenever we discuss “network traffic” or a “collection of packets,”
they are assumed to be actually represented by traffic attribute sets.
4.2.2 Multilayered Rule-Graph
The network topology and the configuration information (policy rules) from the access control
devices are internally represented by the consistency checker using a specially constructed data
structure called a multilayered rule graph. Figure 4.7 shows a simplified representation of a pos-
sible two-layered rule graph for the network shown on the left side of the figure. The rule graph
captures the network interconnectivity and data flow among the policy enforcement rules. In the
top-level, or the network-layer, rule graph, there are some nodes that correspond to devices that
accept traffic and other nodes that correspond to rules in devices through which traffic passes. A
firewall (dedicated or host-based) is represented by as many nodes as it has rules, with both in-
bound and outbound rules being presented; a host (terminal or proxy) is represented by just one
node. A node representing rule ri in firewall Fm directs an arc to a node representing rule r j in
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firewall Fn if 1) the action (access control decision) associated with the rule ri is to accept, and 2)
a network packet that is thus accepted can be received (in accordance with the network topology)
by firewall Fn. A node representing a proxy host (that allows for traffic to pass through it) has both
incident and outgoing arcs.
Nodes representing hosts may further expand into a lower-level rule graph; Figure 4.7 shows a
potential host-layer rule graph (modeled as a directed graph with labeled edges) representing the
SELinux policy rules for one of the hosts in the network-layer rule graph. The arcs in this rule
graph change the security contexts and/or the permissions of various objects present on the host.
The overall strategy used by the consistency checker is to analyze paths from traffic sources to
terminal nodes in the rule graph. A terminal node may be a rule associated with a “deny” action,
a destination, or an exit from the system. A path describes a possible sequence of access policy
decisions applied to all traffic that traverses the corresponding devices in the network. The analysis
approach is built around the observation that knowing which rules in the system make decisions
about a piece of traffic tells us something about the attributes of that piece of traffic. A network
packet arriving from the Internet may in principle carry any source address, any destination ad-
dress, any protocol, and any set of user privileges. If the packet is accepted by a particular rule
in the border firewall, then we can infer that its attributes do not satisfy the preconditions of the
earlier rules in the firewall’s rule-set, but do satisfy the preconditions of the rule that it matched.
Every time a rule recognizes traffic, it refines the attributes of the traffic to reflect the constraining
influence of the rules against which the traffic was tested at the firewall. Given a path in the rule
graph, the consistency checker can compute successive refinements of the attribute set of the traf-
fic, user classes, and object permissions that can possibly traverse that path. At each stage along a
path, the current attribute set is matched against the formal specification of the access constraints
to confirm whether it is in violation.
For firewalls using the simple list model, there is no possibility of branching, and the rule graph
is the same list. For firewalls using the complex chain model, branching can be caused by calling
“chain Y” and “returning” from it. To handle such branching, we introduce < P, pass > to indicate
that only packets matching this predicate will remain in this path. For a < P,chainY > rule, we
insert < P, pass > before going to “chain Y”. We also insert < ¬P, pass > for the path that does
not jump to “chain Y.”
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Recursive function calls should be avoided, since they could create loops. Loops can easily
be prevented by ensuring that no rules appear twice on a rule path. Earlier versions of Netfilter
denied a packet when it was found to be in a loop. But it is probably better to avoid doing so
at configuration time. After loops have been eliminated, the rule graph can be constructed by
linearization.
The input to an ACL is denoted by I, which is the collection of packets that can possibly arrive
at this access list. For an ACL using the complex chain model, the rule graph may give n rule
paths from the input to the output. For each of the n rule paths, we traverse the path to collect
information.
For the jth rule < Pj,action j > in the rule path, we define the current state as < A j,D j,Fj >,
where A j and D j denote the network traffic accepted and denied before the jth rule, respectively; Fj
denotes the set of packets that have been diverted to other paths. We use R j to denote the collection
of the remaining traffic that can possibly arrive at the jth rule. R j can be found from the input I
and the current state information, as shown in Equation 4.1.
R j = I∩¬(A j∪D j∪Fj) (4.1)
For the first rule of an ACL, we have the initial value of A1 = D1 = F1 = /0 and R1 = I. After
reading each rule, we update the state according to the state transformation defined in Equation 4.2
until the end of each rule path. A state transform “Si,r ` Si+1” means that if we read in rule r
at state Si, the result will be state Si+1. Note that R is automatically updated when < A,D,F >
changes.
< A,D,F >,< P,accept > `< A∪ (R∩P),D,F >
< A,D,F >,< P,deny > `< A,D∪ (R∩P),F > (4.2)
< A,D,F >,< P, pass > `< A,D,F ∪ (R∩¬P)>
At the end of rule path pathi, we can identify the packets accepted and denied through this path
as Apathi and Dpathi , respectively. Since any packet can take only one path, packets accepted by
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this ACL are the union of those accepted on all paths, as shown in Equation 4.3. In addition, since
the default action of an ACL matches all packets, all packets will be either accepted or denied
(Equation 4.4).
 AACL =
⋃
i∈path Apathi
DACL =
⋃
i∈path Dpathi
(4.3)
 AACL∪DACL = IACLRACL = /0 (4.4)
In the network of distributed firewalls, a packet will go through a series of ACLs to reach the
destination. It needs to survive the filtering of all the ACLs on the path. On the other hand, a well-
engineered network often has multiple paths and uses dynamic routing to improve performance
and reliability. As a result, a packet could traverse different ACL paths at different times.
Given the topology as a directed graph, one can determine all the possible paths from one node
to another. Since each ACL is associated with an individual interface and a direction, one can
build a tree of ACLs. Based on information about network connectivity, one can compute the ACL
tree rooted at a destination using either Depth-First Search (DFS) or Breadth-First Search (BFS)
algorithms. The resulting tree graph reveals all the ACL paths packets may traverse to reach the
destination. Note that we choose to be blind about the underlying routing and assume that all the
paths that are topologically feasible could be taken. The reason is that routing is designed to be
dynamic and adaptive to link failures and loads. In addition, firewall configuration should behave
correctly and consistently regardless of the underlying routing dynamics.
For a large and well-connected graph, the number of paths can be large. For the portions of a
network that are not involved in packet filtering, and therefore do not interfere with the firewall
configurations, we use abstract virtual nodes as representations. This approach can greatly reduce
the complexity of the graph but still keep the relevant information. For the network illustrated
in Figure 2.1, we use three abstract virtual nodes “outside,” “DMZ,” and “inside,” to indicate the
untrusted Internet, DMZ, and trusted internal network, respectively. Data paths between these three
virtual nodes are often the primary concern of firewall administrators. Note that this dissertation
uses the traffic from “outside” to “inside” as an example for discussion. However, our algorithm is
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Figure 4.8: A Sample Rulegraph
general enough to consider traffic between any two points in the network.
Figure 4.8 shows the ACL tree built for Figure 2.1. For any given ACL tree graph, ACLs are
in series, in parallel, or in a combination of them. For a set of n ACLs in series (or in parallel),
packets need to survive the filtering decision of all (or any) of them. Therefore, the accepted set of
packets is the intersection (or union) of these ACLs accepted independently. Thus, the final traffic
attributes become a sequence of unions and intersections of formulas provided by Equations 4.3
and 4.4.
4.3 Policy Specification Formalism: Comparison with LTL
4.3.1 Brief Background on LTL
Linear temporal logic or linear-time temporal logic (LTL) [38] is a modal temporal logic with
modalities referring to time. In LTL, one can encode formulas about the future of paths, e.g., a
condition will eventually be true, or a condition will be true until another fact becomes true. LTL
is a fragment of the more complex CTL∗, which also allows for branching of time and quantifiers.
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As a result, LTL is sometimes called propositional temporal logic.
LTL Syntax
LTL is built up from a finite set of propositional variables AP, the logical operators ¬ and ∨, and
the temporal modal operatorsX and U .
Definition 10. Formally, the set of LTL formulas over AP is inductively defined as follows:
• if p ∈ AP then p is an LTL formula;
• if ψ and φ are LTL formulas then ¬ψ , φ ∨ψ ,X ψ , and φU ψ are LTL formulas.
X is read as “next” andU is read as “until.” Sometimes,N is used in place ofX . In addition
to those fundamental operators, there are other logical and temporal operators, defined in terms of
the fundamental operators that are used to write LTL formulas succinctly. The additional logical
operators are ∧,→,↔, true, and f alse.
Proposition 1. Using equivalences of negation propagation, we can use the operators ¬, ∧, X ,
and U as the fundamental operators to express any LTL formula.
Proof. This follows from Definition 10 and negation propagation over disjunction:
¬(φ ∨ψ)≡ ¬φ ∧¬ψ
The additional temporal operators are below.
• G for always (globally)
• F for eventually (in the future)
• R for release
• W for weakly until
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LTL formulas describe the behavior of the variables in AP over a linear series of time steps
starting at time zero and extending infinitely into the future. We satisfy such formulas over com-
putations, which are functions that assign truth values to the elements of AP at each time instant.
In essence, a computation path pi satisfies a temporal formula φ if φ is true in the zeroth time step
of pi,pi0.
4.3.2 Why LTL?
LTL is a popular choice for expressing properties in model-checking tools. Computational Tree
Logic (CTL) [39] is another candidate, but we feel that LTL makes a better choice for comparison
of expressive power. The reasons for this are manifold.
LTL and CTL have very different kinds of logical expressiveness. Since CTL allows for explicit
existential quantification over paths, it is more expressive in some cases in which we want to reason
about the possibility of the existence of a specific path through the transition system model M, such
as when M is best described as a computation tree. For example, there are no LTL equivalents of the
CTL formulas (EX p) and (AGEF p), since LTL cannot express the possibility of p happening on
some path (but not necessarily all paths) next time, or in the future. LTL describes executions of the
system, not the way in which they can be organized into a branching tree. Intuitively, it is difficult
(or impossible) to express in LTL situations in which distinct behaviors occur on distinct branches
at the same time. Conversely, it is difficult (or impossible) to express in CTL some situations
where the same behavior may occur on distinct branches at distinct times, a circumstance in which
the ability of LTL to describe individual paths is quite useful. In fact, situations in which CTL is
more suitable are rare, so LTL turns out to be more expressive from a practical point of view than
CTL.
From a system design point of view, it is important to be able to write clear and correct spec-
ifications to input into the model checker. Usually, we want to describe behavioral, rather than
structural, properties of the model, making LTL the better choice for specification, since such
properties are easily expressed in LTL but may not be expressible in CTL. For example, we may
want to say that p will happen within the next two time steps, (X p∨XX p), or that if p ever
happens, q will happen too, (F p→Fq), neither of which is expressible in CTL. Similarly, we
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cannot state in CTL that if p happens in the future, q will happen in the next time step after that,
which is simply F (p∧X q) in LTL. Worst of all, CTL’s nature is such that it takes some effort
to determine that these useful properties are not expressible in CTL. Indeed, a thorough compar-
ison of the two logics concludes that CTL is unintuitive, hard to use, ill-suited for compositional
reasoning, and fundamentally incompatible with semiformal verification, while LTL suffers from
none of these inherent limitations and in general is better suited to model-checking.
LTL is a fair language, whereas CTL is not. That is to say that LTL can express properties
of fairness, including both strong fairness and weak fairness, whereas CTL cannot (though CTL
model checkers generally allow users to specify fairness statements separately to compensate for
this shortcoming). For example, the LTL formula (GF p→Fq), which expresses the property
that infinitely many p’s imply an eventual q, is the form of a common fairness statement: a contin-
uous request will eventually be acknowledged. Yet this sentiment is not expressible in CTL. Since
fairness properties occur frequently in the specifications we wish to verify about real-life reactive
systems, this adds to the desirability of LTL as a specification language.
For another example, the common invariance property FG p, meaning “at some point, p will
hold forever” cannot be expressed in CTL. It is difficult to see why this formula is not equivalent
to the CTL formulaAFAG p; after all, we are basically claiming that on all paths, there’s a point
in which p holds in all future states. (The standard semantic interpretation of LTL corresponds to
the “for all paths” syntax of CTL. For that reason, we consider there to be an implicit A operator
in front of all LTL formulas when we compare them to CTL formulas.)
Another frequently cited example of the nonintuitiveness of CTL is the fact that the CTL formula
AX AF p is not equivalent to the formula (AFAX p). Again, the distinction is subtle. The
former formula states that, as of the next time step, it is true that p will definitely hold at some point
in the future or, in other words, p will hold sometime in the strict future. That formula is equivalent
to the LTL formulas XF p and FX p. On the other hand, the meaning of (AFAX p) is the
strictly stronger (and actually quite strange) assertion that on all paths, in the future, there is some
point in which p is true in the next time step on all of the branches from that point.
Those examples illustrate why LTL is frequently considered a more straightforward language,
better suited to specification and more usable for verification engineers and system designers. LTL
is the preferred logic of the two for general property specification and on-the-fly verification. Ver-
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ification engineers have found expression of specifications in LTL to be more intuitive, and less
error-prone, than in CTL, particularly for verification of concurrent software architectures. The
vast majority of CTL specifications used in practice are equivalent to LTL specifications; it is rare
that the added ability to reason over computation tree branches is needed, and it frequently requires
engineers to look at their designs in an unnatural way. The expressiveness, simplicity, and usabil-
ity of LTL, particularly for practical applications like compositional verification, or specification
debugging, make it a good choice for industrial verification.
4.3.3 Expressing LTL Formulas in Our Formalism
We consider policy specifications to be descriptions of properties of traffic paths through the net-
work. We now show that after an initial set of mappings is established between atomic proposi-
tions and constraints, any LTL formula can be translated to our policy specification language. That
would prove that our policy specification language is at least as expressive as LTL.
As stated above, LTL formulas are defined over a set of propositional variables, AP. Every
member of AP is an LTL formula. For a given network, we consider each p ∈ AP to represent
some traffic flow through the network that is either allowed or denied.
In general, an LTL formula can be satisfied by an infinite sequence of truth evaluations of the
propositional variables in AP. Each such sequence can be considered to be an ω-word over the
alphabet 2AP. We can consider each ω-word to represent a path through the network, or more
specifically, a path through the equivalent rule-graph. In view of those semantics attached to the
LTL formulas, we restrict our current discussion to finite length paths through the network (i.e.,
we only consider ω-words of finite length).
Definition 11. Given a set of propositional variables AP, each member of which represents an
allowed or denied path through the rule-graph for the given network, we construct the initial set of
constraints as follows: ∀φi ∈ AP, define a non-conditional constraint ψi, where ψi characterizes
the traffic that φi represents and ψi.ω = allowexact or deny depending on whether phii represents
allowed or denied traffic. We consider ∀φi ∈ AP,φi ≡ ψi.
Now to show that any LTL formula (given our restrictions) can be expressed in our policy spec-
ification language, we will show that the LTL formulas formed through the use of the fundamental
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operators shown in Proposition 1 are equivalent to constraints already present in those defined in
Definition 11, or can be constructed and added to the set of all constraints.
Proposition 2. (Negation) If φi is an LTL formula and ψi is its equivalent constraint, then ¬φi is
equivalent to the constraint formed by changing ψi.ω from allowmin to deny and vice versa. The
new constraint is henceforth represented by ¬ψi.
Proof. Let w = a1,a2, . . . ,an, where ai ∈ 2AP, be an ω-word or equivalently a traffic flow through
the given network. We know that w |= ¬φi if w 6|= φi. Now, if w 6|= φi, we know from Definition 11
that w 6|= ψi. That means the traffic represented by w is denied by psii if psii.ω = allowexact or
allowed by psii if psii.ω = deny. Therefore, if we toggle psii.ω (forming ¬ψi), traffic represented
by w would satisfy the new constraint. Hence, w |= ¬ψi. Consequently, we have shown that
w |= ¬φi⇒ w |= ¬ψi
We can provide a similar argument in the other direction.
Proposition 3. (Conjunction) Let φi and φ j are LTL formulas, and ψi and ψ j are their equivalent
constraints.
• If ψi and ψ j are of same type (both allow or both deny), then φi ∧ φ j ≡ ψi ∧ψ j, where
(ψi ∧ψ j) = (ψi.V s ∪ψ j.V s,ψi.V d ∪ψ j.V d,λ ,ψi.ω). λ = ψi.λ if ψi.λ = ψ j.λ , λ = any
otherwise.
• If ψi and ψ j are of different types, say ψi.ω = allowexact and psi j.ω = deny, then φi ∧
φ j ≡ ψi ∧ψ j, where (ψi ∧ψ j) = (ψi.V s ∪¬ψ j.V s,ψi.V d ∪¬ψ j.V d,λ ,ψi.ω). λ = ψi.λ if
ψi.λ = ψ j.λ , λ = any otherwise.
Proof. This is evident from the construction. Note that the union of two traffic terminuses if the
tuple formed by calculating the set union of corresponding elements of each tuple. Similarly,
the negation of a traffic terminus is the tuple obtained by calculating the set subtraction from the
corresponding universal set for each element of the tuple.
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Proposition 4. (Next) Let the rule-graph contain m edges. Let E1,E2, . . . ,Em be constraints al-
lowing traffic to travel along each edge in the rule-graph respectively (and nothing else). Let φi be
an LTL formula and ψi be its equivalent constraint. Then,
X φi ≡ (ψi|E1)∧ . . .∧ (ψi|Em)
.
Proof. Let w = a1,a2, . . . ,an, where ai ∈ 2AP, be an ω-word or equivalently a traffic flow through
the given network. Let w(i) = ai. Let wi = ai,ai+1, . . . ,an, which is a suffix of w. We know from
LTL semantics that w |=X φi if w2 |= φi. Let us assume that w2 |= φi. Since, φi ≡ ψi, we have
w2 |= ψi. Furthermore, w(1) = a1 represents the traffic along an edge in the network and satisfies
exactly one of E1,E2, . . . ,Em, say E1. Now, as we have described in Definition 4, conditionally
composed constraints are evaluated as met or true, if the conditioning (i.e., the second) constraint
is not met (which is the case for E2, . . . ,Em). Therefore,
w |= ψi|E j,2≤ j ≤ m (4.5)
Now, since we know that E1 is met, ψi|E1 reduces to ψi being applied to traffic that has already
satisfied E1, and we already know that w2 |= ψi, implying that
w |= ψi|E1 (4.6)
From equations 4.5 and 4.6, we have w |= (ψi|E1)∧ . . .∧ (ψi|Em). We can provide a similar
argument in the other direction, proving the equivalence.
Proposition 5. (Until) Let φi and φ j are LTL formulas, and ψi and ψ j are their equivalent con-
straints. Let pi1, . . . ,pin be constraints representing each non-empty path that is a prefix of a path
represented by ψi. Then
φiU φ j ≡ (pi1|¬ψ j)∧ . . .∧ (pin|¬ψ j)∧ (ψ j|¬ψi)
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Proof. Let w = a1,a2, . . . ,an, where ai ∈ 2AP, be an ω-word or equivalently a traffic flow through
the given network. Let w(i) = ai. Let wi = ai,ai+1, . . . ,an, which is a suffix of w. We know from
LTL semantics that w |= φiU φ j if ∃k > 0 such that wk |= φ j and for 0 < l < k,wl |= φi. Intuitively,
it means that φi must remain true until φ j becomes true. We make use of the fact that we are
restricted to finite length paths to enumerate each prefix sub-path in ψi.
From Propositions 2, 3, 4, and 5, it inductively follows that any LTL formulas (formed through
the use of the fundamental operators shown in Proposition 1) has an equivalent specification in our
policy specification language. Therefore, we can claim that our policy specification language is at
least as expressive as LTL.
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CHAPTER 5
EXHAUSTIVE ANALYSIS
The algorithms described in this chapter produce an exhaustive list of all the inconsistencies and
policy violations in the implementation of access control policy. For a given system, characterized
by its network topology and firewall rule-sets, and a global policy specification, the products of
exhaustive analysis are:
• A complete list of single firewall inconsistencies and redundancies for each firewall in the
system.
• A complete list of inter-firewall inconsistencies among the firewalls in the system.
• A complete list of all the paths through the network that violate one or more global policy
constraints (further identifying which constraints are violated by each such path).
• A list of root causes for the policy violations.
5.1 Identifying Inconsistencies
We start with algorithms to identify the intra-firewall and inter-firewall inconsistencies.
First, we consider the checks localized to ACLs on a single firewall. Since a firewall can rely
on the filtering action of other firewalls to achieve policy conformance, local checks focus on
checking inconsistency and inefficiency. The local check is performed after each rule is parsed,
and just before the state is updated as defined in Equation 4.2.
The input to a localized rule-sub-graph is the entire set (I = Ω), and A1 = D1 = F1 = /0. We
process each rule in sequence based on its type:
For < P,accept > rules:
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1. Pj ⊆ R j⇒ valid: This is a valid rule, as it defines an action for a new set of packets and does
not overlap with any preceding rules.
2. Pj∩R j = /0⇒masked rule: This is an “error,” as the rule will not match any packets and the
accompanying action would never be taken. It has the following sub-cases:
(a) Pj ⊆ D j⇒ shadowing: The rule intended to accept some packets denied by preceding
rules, thereby revealed to be a misconfiguration.
(b) Pj∩D j = /0⇒ redundancy: All packets have already been accepted by preceding rules
or will not take this path.
(c) Otherwise⇒ redundancy and correlation.
3. Pj * R j and Pj∩R j 6= /0⇒ partially masked rule:
(a) Pj ∩D j 6= /0⇒ correlation: Some of the packets this rule intended to accept have been
denied by previous rules. This is a “warning” of potential misconfiguration.
(b) ∀x < j,∃< Px,deny > such that Px ⊆ Pj⇒ generalization: Rule j is a generalization of
rule x, since the latter matches a subset of the former’s predicate but define a different
action. This is a “warning” of potential misconfiguration.
(c) Pj ∩ A j 6= /0 and ∀x < j,∃ < Px,accept > such that Px ⊆ Pj ⇒ redundancy: If rule
< Px,accept > is removed, all packets matching that rule can still be accepted by <
Pj,accept >. This is an “error.”
Similarly, for < P,deny > rules:
1. Pj ⊆ R j⇒ valid.
2. Pj∩R j = /0⇒ masked rule, with following sub-cases:
(a) Pj⊆A j⇒ shadowing: This rule intended to deny some packets that have been accepted
by preceding rules. There is a serious “error” in one of the rules.
(b) Pj∩A j = /0⇒ redundancy: All the packets have been denied by preceding rules or will
not travel this path.
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(c) Otherwise⇒ redundancy and correlation.
3. Pj * R j and Pj∩R j 6= /0⇒ partially masked rule:
(a) Pj ∩A j 6= /0⇒ correlation: Some of the packets that this rule intended to deny have
been accepted by previous rules.
(b) ∀x < j,∃< Px,accept > such that Px ⊆ Pj⇒ generalization: Rule j is a generalization
of rule x, since the latter matches a subset of the former’s predicate but define a different
action. This is a “warning” of potential misconfiguration.
(c) Pj ∩D j 6= /0 and ∀x < j,∃ < Px,deny > such that Px ⊆ Pj ⇒ redundancy: If rule
< Px,deny > is removed, all packets matching that rule can still be denied by <
Pj,accept >. This is an “error.”
After passing the local checks, we perform distributed checks for networks of access control
devices. We start from the top of the network-layer rule-graph and go downwards level-by-level.
At the top, the input is the entire (universal) set (I =Ω), and A1 = D1 = F1 = /0.
The inter-firewall consistency checks are performed much like the single-firewall rule-sub-graph
checks, as follows.
For < P,accept > rules:
1. P⊆ I⇒ valid: This is not a redundancy, as it would be fore local checks.
2. P⊆¬I⇒ shadowing: The rule shadowed by upstream ACLs as it is trying to accept packets
that were denied on all reachable paths to it.
For < P,deny > rules:
1. P⊆ I⇒ increased security level.
2. P ⊆ ¬I ⇒ potential redundancy: This represents either defense in depth or oversight; a
“warning” is flagged for review.
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5.2 Identifying Policy Violations
We start with a formal description of the base algorithm that interfaces rule-graph exploration with
the policy specification. We then introduce various optimizations to the base algorithm, such as
the incorporation of sub-path caching and data structures for attribute sets. We describe various
heuristics for post-analysis for root cause identification, such as sort-threshold and min-cut.
The main algorithm for identifying policy violations is as follows. We assume a conflict-free
global policy specification.
The global policy specification is used to calculate five traffic attribute sets for each node in the
network. Let TASU represent the universal set of network traffic. So, for a node i, we calculate:
• TASiallow must : traffic that must reach the node i. This is calculated from the allowexact con-
straints.
• TASiallow should: traffic that is allowed to reach, but does not need to reach, node i. This is
calculated from the allowmin constraints.
• TASideny explicit : traffic that is explicitly prevented from reaching node i. This is calculated
from the deny constraints.
• TASiallow = TASiallow must
⋃
TASiallow should: traffic that is allowed to reach the node i.
• TASideny = (TASU −TASiallow)
⋃
TASideny explicit : traffic that must not reach the node i.
We also associate a traffic attribute set, TASireached , with each node, representing the traffic that has
been found to be arriving at the node during our analysis. Initially, ∀i,TASireached = /0.
Once we have calculated the distributed version of the global policy specification as described
above, we perform an exploration of the rule-graph using a DFS-like algorithm. We perform such
explorations several times, once with each node in the network as the initial source of the traffic.
The exploration follows the algorithm described in Section 4.2.2. As noted in that section, the
entire rule-graph is never explicitly generated; we generate only the portions related to the current
path being explored. We use the same terminology and symbols used in Section 4.2.2, namely
• I: TAS representing the possible traffic arriving at an ACL.
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• A j: TAS representing the traffic accepted by rules 1 through ( j−1).
• D j: TAS representing the traffic denied by rules 1 through ( j−1).
• R j: TAS representing the traffic that can possibly be accepted by the jth rule.
When arriving at a node representing a firewall, we first process the AAA-related ACLs and use
the results from their exploration to divide the input TAS I into authenticated and unauthenticated
input TAS’s. When we arrive at an ACL, we travel through its constituent rules sequentially,
computing the traffic attribute sets A j, D j, and R j for each rule. After computing each A j, we use
that as the input TAS for downstream nodes in the rule-graph, i.e., the other ACLs and hosts that are
reachable in a single hop through the network. If needed, we perform network address translation
(NAT) based transformation before passing A j as input to the downstream nodes, replacing the
source or destination IP addresses appropriately. We also use information about the VPN overlays
and routing tables when determining potential downstream nodes.
The algorithm recursively returns if the current R j becomes empty, or a host is reached. If a host
has been reached, we perform the following steps before returning.
• We check I, the traffic incident on the host, for compliance with TASiallow and TASideny sets
for the host. If either (I− TASiallow) or (I ∩ TASideny) is not empty, we update the global
list of violations found with the current path, along with the violating traffic as well as the
underlying constraints that produced the portions of TASiallow and TAS
i
deny that were violated.
• We update the TASireached set associated with the host to include the incident traffic. After
the update, we check whether TASiallow must ⊆ TASireached; if true, we set a Boolean indi-
cator associated with the host, allow must validi, to be true, indicating that the allowexact
constraints related to the host have been satisfied.
After we have completed the recursive DFS-like exploration with a given start node, we add all
the nodes for which the allow must validi indicator is still false to the global list of violations.
Once we have performed the exploration with each potential starting node, we return the global
list of violations.
We make some additional optimizations to the algorithm described above.
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• Using sub-network TAS as initial source: Instead of performing multiple runs of the explo-
ration algorithm with each host serving as the starting point in turn, we use the TAS of each
LAN-based sub-network as the initial source. Each time a violation is found, we disam-
biguate the initial source IP address based on the particular constraints that were violated.
• Using cached computations for memoization: We cache the various set-theoretic computa-
tion chains at each ACL in a lookup table indexed by the attributes of the incident TAS,
I, and the A j’s for each rule in the ACL. Then each time we progress to a rule within the
ACL while exploring the rule-graph, we use memoization to avoid repeated computation, by
performing efficient lookup operations to find identical or near-identical (at most one dimen-
sion of the relevant interval tree differs) past calculations. Those cached results can then be
used directly (in case of an identical match) or with minor tweaks (in case of a near-identical
match). This memoization-based optimization significantly increases the memory require-
ments for our algorithm, but results in a big performance boost, particularly for networks
with a large number of firewalls and sub-networks. The additional memory usage is not a
major concern since the rule-graph is never explicitly modeled in its entirety at any stage of
the algorithm. If the memory usage does become a concern, we provide the option of only
caching the results of the last n computation chains at each ACL, where n can be reduced to
lower the memory usage.
The final output of the analysis is a list of paths that violate one or more global access policy
constraints. Each identified violating path further indicates the subset of constraints it violated and
the attributes of the ending traffic that resulted in the violation. The paths typically begin at a host
and end at a host, and include in the middle one or more rules matched in intervening firewalls
(with only a single rule from any given firewall).
Even a few misconfigurations in firewall rule-sets can result in several violating paths. While
they can provide a comprehensive view of the problems in the network, it would be useful to
precisely identify the misconfigured rules that caused the violations. We provide two mechanisms
for post-analysis root case identification.
Sort-threshold: We sort all the individual firewall rules found in all the violating paths by the
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frequency of their occurrence. We report the rules with the frequency of occurrence above a
user-specified threshold as the most likely root causes.
Min-cut: For each connected component in the sub-graph formed by the union of all the violating
paths through the rule-graph, we identify the minimal set of internal vertices (the internal
vertices represent various firewall rules that are part of one or more violating paths) that can
be removed to make each connected component disconnected. We model this problem as
a network flow problem with multiple sources and sinks, and the capacity and flow across
each edge both being 1. We use a version of the minimum cut algorithm described by Hao
and Orlin in [45], as it was shown to be the most robust performer in [46].
Sort-threshold is very fast, but is not guaranteed to be accurate. On the other hand, min-cut can
be considerably more expensive computationally (depending on the size of the sub-graph formed
by the union of violating paths), but is guaranteed to be accurate. Our implementation of the
exhaustive analysis algorithms in the NetAPT tool provides users the option to select either method
for root cause identification. In practice, as noted in Chapter 9, during the application of NetAPT
to various test cases and industry field tests on networks of varying size and complexity, we have
found that sort-threshold with a threshold parameter of 10 is sufficient to identify all the root
causes.
5.3 Analytic Evaluation
We now provide an analysis of the space and time complexity of the algorithm (as a function of
the topology, the policy and the number of misconfigurations). We analyze the effect of optimiza-
tions on the base algorithm on (worst case) space and time requirements. We provide analytic
comparison of our algorithms with vanilla model-checking.
The order of growth for a graph algorithm is usually expressed as a function of |V |, the number
of vertices, and |E|, the number of edges.
The order of growth for BFS is O(|V |+ |E|), which is a convenient way to say that the run time
grows in proportion to either |V | or |E|, whichever is “bigger.”
To see why, think about these four operations:
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Adding a vertex to the queue: this happens once for each vertex, so the total cost is in O(|V |).
Removing a vertex from the queue: this happens once for each vertex, so the total cost is in
O(|V |).
Marking a vertex “visited”: this happens once for each vertex, so the total cost is in O(|V |).
Checking whether a vertex is marked: this happens once each edge, so the total cost is in O(|E|).
Adding them up, we get O(|V |+ |E|). If we know the relationship between |V | and |E|, we can
simplify this expression. For example, in a regular graph, the number of edges is in O(|V |) so BFS
is linear in |V |. In a complete graph, the number of edges is in O(|V |2) so BFS is quadratic in |V |.
Of course, this analysis is based on the assumption that all four operations—adding and remov-
ing vertices, marking and checking marks—are constant time.
Marking vertices is easy. You can add an attribute to the Vertex objects or put the marked ones
in a set and use the in operator.
But making a first-in-first-out (FIFO) queue that can add and remove vertices in constant time
turns out to be non-trivial.
We start with a simplified version of the algorithm that considers all edges the same length. The
more general version works with any non-negative edge lengths.
The simplified version is similar to the breadth-first search except that instead of marking visited
nodes, we label them with their distance from the source. Initially all nodes are labeled with
an infinite distance. Like a breadth-first search, Dijkstra’s algorithm uses a queue of discovered
unvisited nodes.
1. Give the source node distance 0 and add it to the queue. Give the other nodes infinite
distance.
2. Remove a vertex from the queue and assign its distance to d. Find the vertices it is connected
to. For each connected vertex with infinite distance, replace the distance with d+1 and add
it to the queue.
3. If the queue is not empty, go back to Step 2.
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The first time we execute Step 2, the only node in the queue has distance 0. The second time,
the queue contains all nodes with distance 1. Once those nodes are processed, the queue contains
all nodes with distance 2, and so on.
So when a node is discovered for the first time, it is labeled with the distance d+1, which is the
shortest path to that node. It is not possible that we will discover a shorter path later, because if
there were a shorter path, we would have discovered it sooner. That is not a proof of the correctness
of the algorithm, but it sketches the structure of the proof by contradiction.
In the more general case, where the edges have different lengths, it is possible to discover a
shorter path after we have discovered a longer path, so a little more work is needed.
Most arithmetic operations are constant time; multiplication usually takes longer than addition
and subtraction, and division takes even longer, but these run times don’t depend on the magnitude
of the operands. Very large integers are an exception; in that case the run time increases linearly
with the number of digits.
Indexing operations—reading or writing elements in a sequence or dictionary—are also constant
time, regardless of the size of the data structure.
The string method join is usually faster because it is linear in the total length of the strings.
As a rule of thumb, if the body of a loop is in O(na) then the whole loop is in O(na+1). The
exception is if we can show that the loop exits after a constant number of iterations. If a loop runs
k times regardless of n, then the loop is in O(na), even for large k. Multiplying by k doesn’t change
the order of growth, but neither does dividing. So if the body of a loop is in O(na) and it runs n/k
times, the loop is in O(na+1), even for large k. Most string and tuple operations are linear, except
indexing and len, which are constant time. The built-in functions min and max are linear. The
run-time of a slice operation is proportional to the length of the output, but independent of the size
of the input.
All string methods are linear, but if the lengths of the strings are bounded by a constant—for
example, operations on single characters—they are considered constant time. The in operator for
sequences uses a linear search; so do string methods like find and count.
If the elements of the sequence are in order, we use a bisection search, which is O(logn).
Bisection search is similar to the algorithm we probably use to look a word up in a dictionary
(a real dictionary, not the data structure). Instead of starting at the beginning and checking each
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item in order, we start with the item in the middle and check whether the word we are looking for
comes before or after. If it comes before, then we search the first half of the sequence. Otherwise
we search the second half. Either way, we cut the number of remaining items in half.
add appends a key-value tuple to the list of items, which takes constant time.
get uses a for loop to search the list: if it finds the target key it returns the corresponding value;
otherwise it raises a KeyError. So get is linear.
An alternative is to keep the list sorted by key. Then get could use a bisection search, which
is O(logn). But inserting a new item in the middle of a list is linear, so this might not be the best
option. There are other data structures, namely Red-Black Trees, that can implement add and get
in log time, but that’s still not as good as a hashtable, so let’s move on.
One way to improve LinearMap is to break the list of key-value pairs into smaller lists. Here’s
an implementation called BetterMap, which is a list of 100 LinearMaps. As we’ll see in a second,
the order of growth for get is still linear, but BetterMap is a step on the path toward hashtables:
find_map uses the modulus operator to wrap the hash values into the range from 0 to len
(self.maps), so the result is a legal index into the list. Of course, this means that many different
hash values will wrap onto the same index. But if the hash function spreads things out pretty evenly
(which is what hash functions are designed to do), then we expect n/100 items per LinearMap.
Since the run time of LinearMap.get is proportional to the number of items, we expect Bet-
terMap to be about 100 times faster than LinearMap. The order of growth is still linear, but the
leading coefficient is smaller. That’s nice, but still not as good as a hashtable.
Here (finally) is the crucial idea that makes hashtables fast: if we can keep the maximum length
of the LinearMaps bounded, LinearMap.get is constant time. All we have to do is keep track of
the number of items and when the number of items per LinearMap exceeds a threshold, resize the
hashtable by adding more LinearMaps. get just dispatches to BetterMap. The real work happens
in add, which checks the number of items and the size of the BetterMap: if they are equal, the
average number of items per LinearMap is 1, so it calls resize.
resize make a new BetterMap, twice as big as the previous one, and then “rehashes” the items
from the old map to the new.
Rehashing is necessary because changing the number of LinearMaps changes the denominator
of the modulus operator in find_map. That means that some objects that used to wrap into the
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same LinearMap will get split up (which is what we wanted, right?).
Rehashing is linear, so resize is linear, which might seem bad, since we indicated that add
would be constant time. But remember that we don’t have to resize every time, so add is usu-
ally constant time and only occasionally linear. The total amount of work to run add n times is
proportional to n, so the average time of each add is constant time.
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CHAPTER 6
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
When the networked system (considered together with the relevant components of the IT network)
being analyzed is large and deep, the combinatorics of the possible interactions among the access
control devices and mechanisms may render a comprehensive exhaustive analysis computationally
impossible. The underlying rule graph would simply contain too many paths to allow an exhaustive
exploration, especially when the actual paths of interest (i.e., the violations) form a very small
subset of the set of all possible paths through the rule graph.
To handle this challenge, we incorporate a statistical analysis approach that produces a sample
(likely incomplete) set of policy violations, and a quantitative estimate of the remainder. The
latter may take the form of estimates of the total number of violations, the fraction of all traffic
that violates global policy, or the probability that there are no violations given that none were
discovered during a specified amount of time after the analysis was performed.
We obtain statistically valid estimates of such quantitative measures without actually exploring
the entire rule graph. We do so through repeated and random exploration of an extended version
of the rule graph to sample a few paths, using mathematically formulated heuristics to guide the
choice at each step of the exploration towards the likely sources of policy violation. The desired
set of metrics is calculated for each sampled path, and then we use “importance sampling” [47]
to remove the bias introduced by the guidance heuristic and obtain unbiased estimators of the
metrics. As the analysis continues, the user can watch the progress of the analysis, including
the convergence of the chosen set of metrics, using the graphical front-end. The process can be
continued until a user-specified relative error bound is reached or a user-specified fraction of the
rule graph has been explored. The user can also abort the analysis at any time.
The main technical objective of this aspect of our work is to develop metrics that measure secu-
rity compliance, use importance sampling to estimate them, and prove critical properties of the im-
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portance sampling heuristics. Importance sampling biases sampling towards paths that contribute
the most to the metric. While this technique cannot prove that no violation exists, or guarantee that
it will find every violation, it can provide a very good overall assessment of compliance in systems
that otherwise could not be analyzed.
6.1 Estimation of Security Compliance Metric
We first introduce our ideas about estimating compliance in the context of firewall (that is, firewall-
only) systems. We define a metric that captures an implementation’s compliance with global pol-
icy, but do so in such a way that a user can emphasize the hosts, traffic, and policy rules that matter
most. We then show how to use importance sampling to estimate that metric, report on preliminary
results we’ve achieved, and outline our research plan in the area of estimation.
6.1.1 Metric Definition
It is commonly recognized that formulation of good security metrics is a key problem. One area in
which our work has technical merit is in identification of a good metric for our specific application
domain.
Let Π = (Σ,Ψ) be the global policy specification, where Ψ is the set of global policy rules
(constraints). Consider any given traffic source Vs, and the full set of attributes of a potential packet
p it would send. Different packets could have different levels of importance; for example, some
might be used in critical network services. Notionally, we attach some level of importance w(Vs, p)
to this packet, understanding that ultimately this weight is subjective; while natural default values
are easy to introduce, any specialization has to be provided by a user. Likewise, the violation
of different policy rules might have differing levels of importance. For example, in a domain
whose operations are federally regulated, some violations may have associated fines, while others
will not. Correspondingly, if p violates one or more rules in Ψ, we define the violation score
v(Ψ,Vs, p) ≥ 0 to numerically assess the strength of the violation; again, while v(Ψ,Vs, p) = 1 is
an intuitive default value, a user can tailor the function to encode special needs.
Combining the above definitions, we come up with a packet’s compliance score, c(Ψ,Vs, p) =
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w(Vs, p) ∗ v(Ψ,Vs, p). We use different sums of those scores. Considering all packets that source
Vs might produce, we are led to Vs’s security compliance metric (G ).
G (Ψ,Vs) = ∑
p that Vs can produce
c(Ψ,Vs, p).
At other points, we will refer to the compliance of all packets that follow a common path P
through the rule-graph. If the common source of those packets is defined by Ps, then we obtain
pathP’s security compliance metric:
G (Ψ,P) = ∑
p followingP
c(R,Ps, p). (6.1)
We are ultimately interested in a system’s overall security compliance score. We can weight dif-
ferent sources to reflect relative importance; the weight given to source Vs is denoted by qs. The
system security compliance score is then
G (Ψ) = ∑
sources Vs
qsG (Ψ,Vs). (6.2)
Given the various points where weights are applied, G (Ψ) is a metric whose definition en-
compasses several natural interpretations, depending on the weights chosen. They include the
following:
• A packet’s mean violation score, where the probability distribution may be uniform over the
space of all possible packets or be based on a frequency distribution created from historical
data.
• The fraction of traffic that violates global policy; this is either the fraction associated with a
given source s, or the fraction taken over the entire system. The fractions can be with respect
to IP space, or with respect to frequencies based on historical data.
• Both interpretations above, but limited to violation of a subset of global policy rules.
• The number of paths through the rule-graph that lead to violation of any rule in some subset
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of all rules (including, e.g., the set of all rules).
6.1.2 Review of Importance Sampling
To give a metric meaning, we have to quantify it. A key element of this dissertation’s intellectual
merit is our demonstration that the process of randomly selecting paths through the rule-graph,
when intelligently guided by importance sampling, can efficiently estimate G (Ψ). The basic idea
is to avoid wasting computational effort on paths whose compliance scores are low relative to
others. Biasing the random selection towards paths on which the metric has the largest value
maximizes the “return on investment” of computational work dedicated to that sample.
That general method has a long history in contexts as diverse as estimation of integrals in high
dimensions, chemistry, communications, reliability, and economics. See [48, 49, 50] for a repre-
sentative selection. We have used it ourselves to estimate measures of an attacker’s success against
a system with known vulnerabilities [33]. The challenge is that the sampling strategies are neces-
sarily domain-specific. The strategies one uses to estimate the value of rate constants in chemical
reactions depend on the chemical equations being studied; the strategies one uses to estimate the
probability of buffer overflow in a network switch are completely different. Each strategy must
take advantage of what is known about the domain, in order to bias sampling toward system states
that have the largest impact on the metric being estimated.
A simple example illustrates importance sampling. Let X be a random variable with probability
density function u, let A ⊂ R, and let γ = Pr{X ∈ A}. Define the indicator random variable
1{X∈A} as follows: sample x. If x ∈ A set 1{X∈A} = 1, otherwise set 1{X∈A} = 0. It follows that
γ = Eu[1{X∈A}], with the expectation taken with respect to u.
A naive Monte Carlo estimate of γ generates samples X1,X2, . . . ,XN using the density u, and
constructs estimator
γˆN =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
1{Xi∈A}.
γˆN is unbiased, in the sense that Eu[γˆN ] = γ .
The width of the associated confidence interval is proportional to the standard deviation, which
is
√
γ(1− γ)/N. For γˆN to have numerical significance relative to its uncertainty, we need for
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the relative error
√
γ(1− γ)/N/γ to be small. Problems arise when γ is small; a very large N is
needed to continue to maintain a small relative error.
Importance sampling achieves small relative error using significantly smaller N than naive sam-
pling uses. We define another probability density function u′(x), with u′(x)> 0 for all x ∈ A such
that u(x)> 0. Then, γ = Eu′[1{X∈A}Lp′(X)], where Lp′(x) = u(x)/u′(x) is known as the likelihood
ratio, and the expectation is taken with respect to u′. We generate samples X ′1,X
′
2, . . . ,X
′
N , using u
′.
Then
ˆˆγN =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
1{Xi∈A}Lp′(Xi)
is an unbiased estimator of γ . It has been shown [47] that to reduce the variance of the estimator
ˆˆγN , we need to make the likelihood ratio u(x)/u′(x) small on the set A, e.g., u′ should bias towards
x ∈ A.
The aim, then, is that through the use of importance sampling, the relative error associated with
N samples will be smaller than the relative error for N samples from a normal Monte Carlo scheme.
That implies greater accuracy for the estimator, meaning significantly better results for the same
number of samples.
An identical discussion applies for estimating α = Eu[W (X)1{X∈A}], where W is some function
of the random variable.
6.1.3 Application to Security Compliance Metric G (Ψ)
Importance sampling is a general technique, but the challenge in using it lies in applying the
general theory to a specific context. We must prove that the random variable whose mean we can
estimate by Monte Carlo sampling is identical to G (Ψ); we must prove that the strategy we use to
bias sampling for importance sampling is correct, in the sense of estimating G (Ψ) as well; we also
need to prove that the biased sampling technique is computationally effective.
Each Monte Carlo trial in our approach is a random sample of a path through the rule-graph that
ends either in delivery to a host, or in rejection at a firewall; each trial thus has a path compliance
score (recall Equation 6.1). The path chosen can be represented by the random variable X in the
example above, and the event of the path violating global policy can be represented by an indicator
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1{X∈A}. Probability density function u reflects the random selection of rules that define the path.
The path compliance value is can be represented by the function W (x).
Sample Space: In order to create unbiased estimators, we have to put random path selection on
a firm mathematical footing. The first step is to identify a useful sample space, or set of events that
can occur during sampling.
Let S be the set of all rule-graph nodes. Let S0 denote the set of root nodes, i.e., the traffic
sources. A sample sequence is any infinite sequence {di ∈ S , i > 0}. There is no supposition
of any kind of structure, except that each element of the sequence is drawn from S . We use
the term valid prefixes to describe legitimate complete paths in the rule graph, starting in S0 and
terminating in a final policy decision. “Legitimate” here means that there exists a packet with
attributes such that the firewall rules force it to traverse that path.
We say that a valid prefix is interesting if the corresponding path conflicts with global policy,
and let V be the set of all interesting prefixes. Let the sample space Ω be the set of all sample
sequences, including infinite ones. We can enumerate the nodes in S , and transform each index
into a single digit in the base |S | number system. That means that we can establish a one-to-
one correspondence between every real number in [0,1] and every element of Ω; given sample
sequence d1,d2, . . . (where the di are the base |S | digits representing the nodes), we map to the
base |S | the real number (0.d1d2d3 . . .)|S |, and vice versa. We can thus associate a uniformly
random sample U from [0,1] with a unique element of Ω. Equivalently, we define a probability
measure on Ω such that all sample sequences are equally likely. Henceforth, we drop the subscript
|S |, and all real numbers are in base |S |.
The set of all sample sequences with the interesting prefix (0.d1d2 . . .dl) (i.e., all sample se-
quences whose first l elements are identical to d1,d2, . . . ,dl) form a closed interval of length |S |−l
starting at (0.d1d2 . . .dl). For every interesting prefix v, the corresponding interval is denoted by
Iv, and its length by lv. Notice that if v,w ∈ V , then Iv∩ Iw = /0. It can be seen that A = ⋃v∈V Iv
forms a finite union of disjoint intervals. Hence, the probability of a uniform sample u ∈ [0,1] also
having u ∈A is the sum of the lengths of the constituent intervals. Due to the large size of Ω, that
total probability would be very small, and membership in V would be a rare event under uniform
sampling on [0,1].
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Unbiased Estimation: Our development of Ω sets the stage for constructing an unbiased es-
timator of G (R). Given any value x ∈ [0,1], we can identify the prefix vx that is in one-to-one
correspondence with x and hence identify the path Pvx represented by that prefix, and determine
(i) the length lvx of that prefix, and (ii) whether the prefix is interesting. For interesting prefixes vx,
we compute (recalling Equation 6.1) M(x) = |S |lvxG (R,Pvx). Therefore, we have
Eu[M(X)] ≡ Eu[M(X)1{X∈A }] =
∫ ∞
−∞
M(X)1{x∈A }u(x)dx
=
∫
x∈A
M(x)u(x)dx
= ∑
v∈V
(∫
x∈Iv
M(x)u(x)dx
)
= ∑
v∈V
(∫
x∈Iv
M(x)dx
)
= ∑
v∈V
(
|S |lvG (R,Pv)
∫
x∈Iv
dx
)
= ∑
v∈V
|S |lvG (R,Pv)|S |−lv = G (R)
where the introduction of summation is possible becauseA is a finite union of disjoint Iv’s. Hence
Eu[M(X)] is an unbiased estimator of G (Ψ).
Change of Measure: If ordinary Monte Carlo sampling is used on Ω, the standard unbiased
estimator would be 1N ∑
N
i=1 M(Xi), where X1,X2, . . . ,XN are N random samples drawn from [0,1]
(or, equivalently, from Ω) with density u(x). However, estimating Eu[M(X)] this way is extremely
inefficient, as most samples would not correspond to valid prefixes, let alone interesting ones.
The value of this formulation is that given an x that corresponds to a valid prefix, computation
of the probability mass it represents under uniform sampling is straightforward. Each sample
under the importance sampling approach randomly generates a path d1,d2,d3, . . . through the rule
graph, stopping when a final policy action is applied. The path chosen corresponds automatically
to a valid prefix. The probability distribution used to select di given d1,d2, . . . ,di−1 is the biased
sampling strategy. Whatever that strategy is, qv,i denotes the probability of selecting di, given
the prior selections d1,d2, . . . ,di−1, with the understanding that v = (d1,d2, . . . ,di). Mapping a
selected sequence back into a real number x gives rise to a new probability density function u′ on
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[0,1], driven by our biasing strategy. As we have shown in [33], the above change of measure is
valid, and the value of u′(x) for x ∈ Iv for some interesting prefix v is
u′(x) = ∏
lv
i=1 qv,i
length of Iv
=
∏lvi=1 qv,i
|S |−lv = |S |
lv
lv
∏
i=1
qv,i for all x ∈ Iv. (6.3)
Therefore, using importance sampling, we sample N valid prefixes according to our biasing
strategy, map each into base |S | numbers X1,X2, . . . ,XN , and construct the estimator
(1/N)
N
∑
i=1
(
u(Xi)
u′(Xi)
)
M(Xi).
Despite the large numbers symbolically expressed above (e.g., |S |lv), the actual computations
used in constructing this estimator can be done with much smaller values, avoiding the risk of
round-off and precision errors.
6.2 Estimation with No Exceptions Identified
Estimation with no exceptions identified is similar to verification of properties defined in logics
such as LTL if those properties are composed strictly of the always temporal modal operators (G ).
For such properties, verification can be decomposed and any property of the form G φ can be veri-
fied for any sub-model. For example, the approach can be used in statistical analysis of rule-graphs
for verification of network access control policy implementations. In particular, the property φ can
be the global access policy for the networked system being analyzed. During the statistical analy-
sis of the rule-graph for the system, we use some biasing heuristics (and importance sampling) to
direct our exploration of the rule-graph in certain ways. The biasing heuristics typically direct the
exploration towards the “important” nodes in the rule-graph (nodes explicitly mentioned as being
relevant in the global policy, or nodes representing recent configuration changes). On reaching the
stopping criteria for the exploration, if we found some violations or counterexamples, we can use
importance sampling to provide unbiased estimates of the total number of exceptions in the entire
rule-graph.
However, that does not work if no exceptions were found during the exploration. In such a
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situation, we can use the above approach to provide (under certain assumptions), with certain
confidence, the likelihood that there are indeed no exceptions in the system. As an example, we
can use importance sampling to generate an estimate of the total number of paths in the rule-graph
(Nˆ). We already know the exact number of paths that we explored before reaching the stopping
criteria (e). If m is the total number of unexceptional paths in the rule-graph, the probability that
the number of unexceptional paths seen so far is k is given by the hypergeometric distribution:
Pk =
(m
k
)(Nˆ−m
e−k
)(Nˆ
e
)
In this scenario, k = e, as all the paths we have explored were unexceptional. The probability that
of the remaining unexplored paths, i are unexceptional is given by:
P(k = e|m = i) =
(i
e
)(Nˆ−i
0
)(Nˆ
e
) = (ie)(Nˆ
e
)
Using that, we obtain:
P(k = e) =
i=Nˆ
∑
i=e
P(k = e|m = i)
Then, our desired probability would be (from the Bayes theorem):
P(m = Nˆ|k = n) = P(k = n|m = Nˆ)P(m = Nˆ)
P(k = n)
The only unknown in the above equation is P(m = Nˆ), which we can estimate by making certain
assumptions about the system and restricting our analysis to the classes of systems for which those
assumptions are true.
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CHAPTER 7
TOPOLOGY INFERENCE
Before the access control implemented in a networked system can be analyzed by our exhaustive
or statistical analysis algorithms, we need a detailed map of the networked system, indicating
how various devices are connected. It must include the information identified in Section 4 and
Figure 4.3. However, in practice, network administrators frequently do not have this information
with the necessary precision and detail. As a result, we have developed and implemented a set
of algorithms that infer the underlying network topology from a variety of indirect information
sources, such as the native configuration files for various Layer 3 devices, and output the topology
in XML that conforms to the topology schema indicated in Figure 4.3.
7.1 Overall Topology Inference Framework
The main elements of the overall framework are:
1. Topology database: This database stores information about the myriad topology elements
collected from different input sources. The input sources can potentially include firewall
configuration files, dumps from nmap scans, and log files from routers and switches. The
framework includes scripts that provide the necessary interface to the database, while man-
aging its internal integrity and conformance to the relational DB schema set out for it.
2. Input scripts: These scripts provide a modular and extensible way to parse the raw informa-
tion from the various input sources and populate the topology database.
3. Output scripts: These scripts read the information contained in the topology database and
produce “views” of the information in various formats that can be easily visualized and
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Figure 7.1: Topology Inference as Part of Overall Framework
processed. These include formats like GraphML, Graphviz, and our own topology XML
schema.
Currently, our input scripts have primarily focused on firewall configurations as source of con-
nectivity information. A firewall’s configuration includes elements of connectivity information
such as:
• Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) descriptions of the sub-networks that face the fire-
wall’s interfaces.
• “route” statements indicating explicit information about the traffic routed through the fire-
wall.
• VPN descriptions characterizing the terminal points, security associations and other details
about VPN tunnels.
• Access control list rules that indicate the traffic passing through the firewall.
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• Object groups characterizing (and perhaps labeling) hosts, sub-networks, services, among
others.
Our database-based approach uses the above connectivity information to “grow” the knowledge
of the topology. We identify sub-networks that are connected to firewalls and “merge” similar
sub-networks to build additional connections.
Firewall configurations contain elements of extant host IP addresses, such as “name” statements;
ACL, object group and other statements that directly refer to a host IP address; and reverse DNS
lookups. We populate the discovered sub-networks with the discovered host IDs.
Our framework is based on Sandia National Lab’s ANTFARM tool [51]. We have made exten-
sive additions and modifications to the base functionality in ANTFARM.
We add support for layer 3 switches and routers, provide sophisticated network merge algo-
rithms that include support for complex merge disambiguation. The network merge disambigua-
tion tries to answer the following question: if the address of the network N1 is a subset of the
address of network N2, should N1 be considered a part of N2 and be merged into N2? Our merge
algorithm allows for:
• Always merge: we merge whenever possible.
• Description-based merge: we use meta-information stored in the interface blocks of the
firewall configuration files to determine if the networks presented for merge are actually the
same network.
The merging algorithm is tunable through user-specified input that determines how public and
private networks should be merged (e.g., always merge networks with public IP addresses and use
description-based merging for networks with private IP addresses).
We have developed custom input parsers that support a wide variety of features found in the
most popular models of firewalls. Examples include:
• Information in the rules (access-list and access-group commands).
• Support for static and dynamic NATs, and virtual hosts.
• Support for Layer 3 switches and routers.
68
• Support for IPSec Security Associations and VPN tunnels (expands existing ANTFARM
code).
• Support for nested object group definitions, etc.
• Support for meta-information required for description-based merging
We use completely custom output scripts that generate the inferred topology encoded with our
topology XML schema (Figure 4.3).
A much more detailed description and analysis of the algorithms used for topology inference is
provided in Appendix A.
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CHAPTER 8
FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION: NETWORK
ACCESS POLICY TOOL
We have implemented the framework and algorithms described so far in the form of the Network
Access Policy Tool (NetAPT).
8.1 NetAPT Architecture
As shown in Figure 8.1, NetAPT has two independent components:
• a graphical front-end (or management console), written in Java Swing, that system admin-
istrators can run from their workstations and use to provide information about the basic
network topology, to enter specifications of the global access policy (or subsets thereof), and
to set up analyses; and
• an analysis engine, written in C++, which captures the system state and analyzes that infor-
mation with respect to policy specifications.
As indicated in Figure 8.1, the two components of the tool communicate securely over the
network using TCP/TLS protocols. This segregation of functionality makes it possible to use
the analysis engine as an appliance that can be plugged into a suitable spot in the network, from
which it can establish secure connections to the access control elements present on the network
and capture the relevant configuration information. The actual interface between the tool and the
user (the front-end) can then be freely placed where it is convenient for the user.
As shown in the figure, the user first provides a description of the network topology using the
graphical front-end. That can be done with the easy-to-use drawing tools included with the front-
end, or via text files that can be read by the front-end. The information to provide includes all the
relevant access control elements (firewalls, proxy servers, wireless access points); details for each
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Figure 8.1: NetAPT Architecture
element, such as its IP address(es) and parameters that the analysis engine can use to establish
secure connections to the element to capture its configuration; and all the network interactions
between the listed elements. Entities can be grouped together to indicate sub-networks and LANs,
and properties can be specified for such groupings. The front-end converts the visual topology
representation provided by the user to an internal XML representation. We use XML as our under-
lying language for internal representation for most of the information in the tool, which provides
the added benefit that we may interface with third-party tools and applications simply by provid-
ing wrappers that output the XML conforming to our schemas. It is also possible to browse and
select from the list of topology descriptions previously cached remotely at the analysis engine. In
either case, once the topology has been decided, the information is sent over the network to the
analysis engine. The analysis engine uses that information to securely obtain the snapshot of the
access control policy implementation, in the form of configuration files from the various devices
indicated in the topology description (Figure 4.3). It also indexes and caches the topology descrip-
tion and captured configuration information (both of which are encrypted before storage for added
security). The captured information from all the different sources is then converted to XML (using
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a unified schema for firewall rules and another for OS-based mechanisms), and the XML is sent
back to the front-end, where the user can then highlight various elements in the topology diagram
and look at their current configurations (e.g., rule-sets for a firewall).
The user then specifies the global access constraints, which are a subset of the possible com-
prehensive access policy. They indicate some intended behavior against which the user wishes to
check the policy implementation for compliance. The user uses a graphical front-end to specify
constraints for the various elements or groupings of elements, and the tool considers their conjunc-
tion. The individual constraints can express positive as well as negative assertions about the nature
of traffic, roles, user-classes, or applications that can access a particular set of resources (hosts,
specific files or applications, and so forth). In other words, we can express things that should never
happen as well as things that must be allowed. Once specified, the constraints are converted into
an internal XML representation. This approach offers the freedom of being able to use third-party
technologies, such as a variety of modal logics, to specify the global access constraints.
The next step for the user is to set up the analysis. He or she can select either an exhaustive
analysis or a statistical analysis, following which the front-end sends the policy specification and
setup information for the analysis to the analysis engine. The analysis engine sends back the results
as it obtains them, giving the user the option of aborting the analysis at any stage and doing post-
analysis on the partial results. The user can manipulate, filter, or navigate through the results, if
any violations are found, to visualize the problem and diagnose the key misconfigurations behind
the violations. A variety of post-analysis techniques are available in the front-end to help the user
identify the likely root causes of the violations. Once the user has some possibilities in mind,
hypothetical changes can be analyzed using the front-end; the user can make proposed changes
to the configuration of various elements (e.g., modify, delete, or reorder certain rules), and the
new information will be sent to the analysis engine, which then performs a quick re-analysis to
see if the (hypothetically) modified configuration information now conforms to the specification
of the access policy. This feature can also be used to check planned changes in configuration for
compliance quickly, before they are actually rolled out.
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Figure 8.2: Operational Overview of the Analysis Engine
8.2 NetAPT Analysis Engine
Figure 8.2 gives an operational overview of the NetAPT analysis engine. The front-end supplies
the analysis engine with information about the network topology and the parameters for estab-
lishing secure network connections with the access control elements of the topology. Examples
of such parameters include keys for establishing VPN connections to Cisco PIX firewalls and a
guest username and password for establishing SSH connections to Linux and SELinux hosts. Us-
ing the supplied information, the analysis engine can establish connections and obtain the relevant
configuration information, hence capturing a snapshot of the access policy implementation. The
configuration information can take many forms, depending on the mechanisms and devices being
used to enforce access control. It may consist of custom rule descriptions for different kinds of
firewalls, SELinux type and role transition policies, or Java Security Manager policies. NetAPT
integrates policy rules from a large variety of such sources. We have developed a unified XML
schema that captures the essence of the union of all the classes of access control mechanisms that
one is likely to encounter in a modern IT network. The analysis engine includes modules that con-
vert the policy rules (configuration information) from the different sources, with rules from each
source in their own custom language, into XML conforming to our unified schema. That allows
for easy extensibility, as support for new access control mechanisms and devices can be added by
simply writing the translation modules for those devices.
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In NetAPT’s offline analysis mode, it is not necessary to tightly integrate the analysis engine
with the system being analyzed; if needed, the analysis engine can be directed to read in the
configuration snapshot that has been collected offline beforehand and placed locally on the file
system. In the online analysis mode, the analysis engine either periodically checks with access
control devices for any changes in configuration, or is specifically directed towards those changes
by the user via the front-end.
The consistency checker forms the core of the analysis engine. It takes as input the XML rep-
resentations of the collective configuration information from the various devices and of the formal
specification of the access constraints provided by the front-end, and sets up an analysis based on
the parameters supplied by the user (again, using the front-end). As described in Section 8.1, the
output, in the form of the list of violations, is sent back to the front-end. In the online mode, if an
intrusion detection and alert correlation system has been deployed on the network, the results may
also be forwarded to that system in the form of an alert.
8.3 NetAPT Features
We now describe some additional NetAPT features, that have been particularly helpful in getting
the tool adopted by a number of industry partners.
• Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA): The first set of firewall rules provided
to us contained access control lists (ACL) that applied to authentication and authorization.
Of course, those authentication and authorization options exist in the Cisco PIX firewall
rule specifications, but in our early development of NetAPT, we saw AAA as an area that
we would address on an as-needed basis. The rules in those ACLs described the traffic that
needs to be authenticated before normal filtering rules are applied. We also found commands
for setting up the authentication mechanism (such as RADIUS, in which case the location
of the RADIUS server was specified) and the incoming interface to the firewall to which the
AAA-related ACL applied, among others. We consequently modified NetAPT to support
– encoding of the AAA-related information into its universal XML schema for firewall
rule-sets,
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– indication of global policy constraints that apply only to authenticated traffic, and
– consideration of the above two aspects (rule-sets characterizing authenticated traffic
and constraints applicable to such traffic) during the analysis.
Later experience showed us that those features are apparently very common in industrial
control environments and in corporate networks that support medium to high levels of secu-
rity.
• Object Groups: Firewall configurations may support user definition of groups of objects,
e.g., groups of networks, services, protocols, or users. The group definitions may then ap-
pear in a firewall rule, e.g., a network group might be identified as the set of destinations to
which the rule applies. Our industrial partners used object groups extensively, as they are
invaluable aids in describing large networks. We modified NetAPT to parse object group
definitions (even recursive ones) and to provide a graphical interface to those definitions.
We also enhanced NetAPT to allow a user to define NetAPT object groups to be used in the
specification of global policy rules. For example, one object group can be used to encapsu-
late all the devices in the corporate network, and another to encapsulate all the devices in the
control network; global policy rules that govern connections between the two networks can
use the object group definitions in their specifications.
• Topology Discovery: In our initial design of NetAPT, we assumed that the user could spec-
ify his or her system’s network topology. However, we discovered that our partners did not
keep explicit topology information in a form that would allow for convenient communica-
tion of topological information to NetAPT. Furthermore, we were anxious to minimize our
demands on partners’ engineers’ time in support of our efforts. We learned of the ANT-
FARM tool [51], communicated with its developers, and obtained it shortly thereafter, when
it was released as open-source software. ANTFARM uses a relational database to coordi-
nate disparate pieces of connectivity information. When a new connection is discovered,
it is entered into the database, and an ANTFARM script is executed to forge any new con-
nectivity relationships that are a consequence of the prior state of connectivity knowledge
and the new knowledge. Working with ANTFARM and our partners, we discovered that our
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partners needed to annotate some configuration information to help differentiate between
networks, and that ANTFARM needed to parse that annotation. We have since made exten-
sive customizations to the ANTFARM logic, again tailoring it to the technical requirements
of topology discovery for our partners’ networks. Issues related to topology discovery, ver-
ification, and validation have consumed a great deal of our attention. However, it has been
worthwhile. In one notable session with a partner’s network engineer, we found that Ne-
tAPT had discovered a path through the network that the engineer did not believe should be
present. With NetAPT we were able to point out to him the configuration that allowed that
path, and he agreed that the path must be present (and presumably made the configuration
change to close the hole).
• Network Islands: One of our partners’ configurations contained “switch” statements. Switch
statements indicate that traffic leaving through a firewall is routed to another network, which
is not necessarily adjacent to the firewall. Global policy statements may involve such flows,
so we augmented NetAPT’s topology discovery mechanisms to include the connectivity
information specified by switch statements.
• Command Line Processing: One of our partners uses APT much less interactively than
we envisioned. They keep track of changes made to firewall configurations using a tool
called “rancid” (Really Awesome New Cisco config Differ) [52]. This tool maintains a
CVS repository of the changes (diffs) made to the native firewall configurations and can be
used to obtain the latest copy of the rule-sets for any firewall in the system. NetAPT uses
the set of such rule-set files (in their native format, which uses the PIX/ASA command-
set, all collected in a directory) as input for inferring topology and conversion to XML
conforming to NetAPT’s universal rule-set schema. This partner wants to use NetAPT as
an off-line checker that would be run automatically every night against the current rule-set.
Correspondingly, we augmented NetAPT so that it can be run entirely from a command line
with explicitly named input and output files, and thus be run automatically through a “cron”
script.
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• Enhanced Graphical Interface: NetAPT’s graphical display is written using Java libraries.
Our initial display was written using the JGraph library [53], but we found that the size of the
networks we were trying to display required use of a different tool. The NetAPT graphical
engine was re-factored to use the Java Universal Network/Graph Framework (JUNG) [54]
and the Model-View-Controller architectural pattern. The engine was augmented with fea-
tures such as node clustering for easier viewing of large topologies, and zooming. It was also
extended to provide multiple automatic layout schemes (easily accessible from a drop-down
menu) for quickly drawing uncluttered representations of topology files. The users can then
further arrange various elements to their satisfaction and save the topology back to the disk,
such that the tool remembers all the changes made to the drawing. To further reduce clutter,
the user can collapse various networks or collections of networks into a single element in
the topology diagram, which can then be dragged around. Expanding such a collapsed node
causes the constituent nodes to show up again, preserving their relative locations before the
collapse.
• Extended Range of Firewalls Supported: NetAPT transforms firewall rules from specific
firewall vendors and models of firewalls into a unified form, expressed in XML. The anal-
ysis engine works on this unified representation. Whenever a new firewall syntax is to be
integrated into NetAPT, a “native-to-unified” translator needs to be augmented to support
inclusion of the new device. Our partners had firewall models for which this extension was
performed.
• Global Policy Templates: Our partners desired assistance in the development of global access
policies. To facilitate that, we have built into NetAPT a library of global policy templates that
express constraints based on best-practices recommendations such as those in NIST Special
Report SP-800-82 [55]. The templates require a user to define object groups that identify
sets of hosts and/or networks, and to substitute those group identifiers into the templates.
• Global Policy Conflict Detection and Resolution: A global policy is a collection of state-
ments on flows that should be allowed and/or should not be allowed. The expression for-
malism is broad enough that conflicting rules can be concurrently specified. That is not
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necessarily a bad thing; certain forms of conflict can be interpreted so as to give a clear and
intuitive preference of one rule over another. Other conflicts cannot be so resolved, and in-
dicate a need for the user to clarify the intent. We extended NetAPT to identify conflicts in
global policies, and to point out the rules that could be resolved and those that need a user’s
attention.
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CHAPTER 9
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this chapter, we describe how we demonstrated the efficacy of our analysis and topology in-
ference algorithms, as implemented in NetAPT, through a number of experimental studies. We
used several real-world-inspired test cases for our evaluations. Furthermore, to perform even more
comprehensive studies, we have developed a benchmark suite of randomly generated network
topologies and firewall rule-sets that are representative of the real-world network setups to which
we had access.
9.1 Experimental Evaluation Using Test Cases
In this section, we discuss how we demonstrated the efficacy of NetAPT by using it to verify the
access control policy implementation in a variety of settings. We began with test cases that were
relatively small, such as the networking system typically found in a process control setting, and
showed how the exhaustive analysis can be used to weed out misconfigurations of access control
devices. We then demonstrated NetAPT’s scalability through the use of statistical analysis for
analyzing a much larger system that could not be handled by the exhaustive analysis. In all the
experimental evaluations described below, NetAPT’s analysis engine ran on an AMD AthlonXP-
64 3700+ machine with 2GB of RAM.
9.1.1 Evaluation of Exhaustive Analysis
Figure 9.1 shows a testbed developed at the Sandia National Labs to represent a networking infras-
tructure at a typical Oil and Natural Gas (ONG) operator. The focus here is on the protection of
the process control network. The network contains two dedicated Cisco PIX firewalls, each with
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Figure 9.1: A Representative Process Control Testbed
15 rules. Out of the 17 hosts in the network, 5 have host-based firewalls (iptables in Linux). All
the hosts run the stock versions of the Windows or Linux operating systems. The rule-sets for the
various firewalls were populated based on the settings found at a number of actual ONG sites.
The global access constraints were defined, using NetAPT’s graphical front-end, to emphasize
the tightly controlled isolation of the process control network from the rest of the IT network. In
particular, they specified that the hosts in the process control network could access each other; how-
ever, only one (the PCN Historian) could be accessed from outside the process control network.
The only ways the PCN Historian could be accessed were via the DMZ Historian (by a “sysadmin”
class user), or via a host in the corporate network (by a “manager” class user). NetAPT’s graphical
front-end facilitated easy specification of these constraints, which were subsequently translated
into the underlying XML representation of the global policy.
NetAPT’s analysis engine, using the information about the network topology provided by the
front-end, automatically and securely captured the configuration snapshot of the system. An ex-
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haustive analysis of the system was then performed. The analysis identified a total of 83 paths
(sequences of firewall rules) in 10 seconds. The tool was then instructed to perform a post-analysis
on the results to further pinpoint the root causes of the violations. The post-analysis, based on
frequency of occurrence in the list of violations, identified four rules, two in each of the two Cisco
firewalls acting in series, as the likely culprits. It further identified the attributes of the traffic that
they were allowing to pass and also indicated the subset of the global access constraints that the
traffic was violating. Using the graphical front-end, we were able to test hypothetical modifica-
tions to the highlighted rules and perform quick re-evaluation to discover the appropriate changes
that would result in zero violations of the policy specification. As is evident from this experiment,
NetAPT’s exhaustive analysis functionality was very useful for a reasonably small network. A
complete analysis of the testbed indicated that the rule-graph for the system had about 230,000
paths. Hence, the number of violations not only helps identify and correct misconfigurations, but
also, when viewed in the context of the total number of ways traffic could traverse the system, can
serve as a quantitative measure of the system’s security posture.
We also used NetAPT to analyze the sample scripts used in the evaluation of the “Firewall
Policy Advisor” by Al-Shaer and Hamed [17, 18, 19]. We captured all the misconfigurations in
their sample scripts [19]. Note that NetAPT’s functionality is a superset, since our analysis is not
limited to the analysis of relations between just two firewalls, and we can check for inconsistencies
(due to the use of multidimensional interval trees) as well as explicit policy violations.
To explore the scalability of the tool, we tested it on the example setup shown in Figure 2.1. This
testbed represents an intrusion-tolerant publish-subscribe system developed as part of a DARPA-
funded research effort. The system contains 1) over 40 hosts, of which 29 are running SELinux
(each with 4 or more process domains) and all 40 have hardware NIC-based firewalls (with more
than 20 rules per firewall), and 2) 8 Cisco PIX firewalls. As can be imagined, the configuration
of the large number of access control elements in this system in adherence to the global security
policy is an extremely complicated task.
The global access constraints were set to emphasize tightly controlled access to the “System
Manager” group of machines (the top row of 4 machines in the figure). These machines could
access one another in very specific ways (to run Byzantine fault-tolerance algorithms) and could
be accessed by only a very small set of other machines, and only by processes from specific
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domains on those machines. Again, NetAPT’s graphical front-end and underlying XML schema
were used for the specification of the global access constraints.
We then deliberately misconfigured a rule in the hardware NIC-based firewall for one of the
system manager machines, allowing for traffic that would result in the violation of the global
policy. The exhaustive analysis was able to identify the resulting 263 violations and pinpoint the
root cause in about 140 seconds (focusing primarily on the firewall rules, and not on the host-based
access control mechanisms). Note that the total number of paths in the rule-graph for this system
is huge, which explains the time taken by the analysis.
We then made the problem more complex by introducing problems in two firewalls, a Cisco
PIX dedicated firewall and the hardware NIC-based firewall for one of the system manager ma-
chines, such that the violation only occurred in the access decision sequences that included both
rules. The exhaustive analysis, again limited to firewall rules, identified 155 violations and the two
modified rules in about 200 seconds. However, when the host-based access control mechanisms
were also included in the analysis, the exhaustive analysis could not complete, even after running
for more than 3 hours, setting the stage for a demonstration of increased scalability provided by
the statistical analysis.
9.1.2 Evaluation of Statistical Analysis
As described earlier, NetAPT’s statistical analysis can provide a sample set of violations and an
estimate of the remainder. For that purpose, we use the total number of violations as the quanti-
tative estimate of the remainder. The biasing heuristic we use for guiding importance sampling is
based on shortest distance, i.e., it assigns higher weight to those access decisions that would guide
the traffic closest (in a network topology sense) to the hosts that are included in the specification
of the global policy. The stopping criterion for the sampling was 500,000 samples or 5% relative
error with 95% confidence, whichever was achieved first.
Statistical analysis on the Figure 2.1 testbed for the one-rule misconfiguration example described
above resulted in an answer in under 10 seconds (with the relative error convergence being the
stopping criterion). The analysis estimated 255 violations, which is within 3% of the exact answer
obtained from exhaustive analysis.
82
For the example with two misconfigured rules, the statistical analysis obtained an answer within
4% of the exact answer in about 10 seconds when only firewall rules were being analyzed, and in
about 25 seconds when host-based access control mechanisms were also being modeled.
We tested another example, in which, in addition to the two misconfigured rules, we also in-
troduced a misconfiguration in the SELinux policy for the host with the misconfigured host-based
firewall, such that the global policy was now violated only when all three access control points
were included. Again, the exhaustive analysis could not produce the complete list of violations af-
ter running for more than 3 hours, but the statistical analysis was able to provide an estimate with
a 10% confidence interval (where the number of samples analyzed was the stopping criterion) in
about 1 minute. Additional accuracy required a disproportionate increase in the time required for
the analysis. To obtain an estimate with a 5% confidence interval, it was necessary to run the
analysis for about 5 minutes.
Hence, we can see that statistical analysis allows NetAPT to analyze fairly complex systems
within reasonably short periods of time. The tool’s performance can likely be improved further
with the use of better biasing heuristics, which is an avenue that we will continue to explore in the
future.
9.1.3 Field Testing at a Multi-Site PCS
NetAPT aims to facilitate government-mandated compliance audits. We field-tested NetAPT at a
large utility with a networked process control system that was spread over multiple geographical
sites. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and direct fiberoptic connections were used to connect the
different sites. The network had more than 90 firewalls, with a collective total of more than 8000
rules. The network contained more than 3000 hosts.
NetAPT was given access to the rule-sets of all the firewalls, which were maintained in a central
repository using the rancid tool.
NetAPT’s topology generation was able to generate a topology diagram for the underlying net-
work in about 50 minutes. Figure 9.2 shows an anonymized version of a part of the network
topology inferred. The diagram was generated using NetAPT’s graphical front-end. Briefly, the
red circles indicate firewalls, the green circles indicate routers or switches, and the other circles in-
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Figure 9.2: A Network Topology Inferred by NetAPT (Anonymized)
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dicate hosts. The blue triangles represent sub-networks, each containing multiple hosts, that have
been collapsed in the diagram to avoid visual clutter. The green arcs represent VPN tunnels, and
the yellow arcs represent direct fiberoptic connections. The system administrators and network
engineers at our industrial partner verified that the inferred network was correct and captured all
the hosts and sub-networks.
As described in Chapter 8, NetAPT includes parameterized policy templates that encode various
best-practices recommendations and compliance requirements. For the field test, we chose the
policy template that encoded the NERC CIP 005 compliance requirements [56]. We were able
to customize the policy template for the inferred network topology in a couple of hours using the
policy specification component of NetAPT.
An exhaustive analysis of the inferred topology for compliance with the NERC CIP 005 pol-
icy was completed in 55 seconds, during which multiple exceptions were identified. The network
administrators were able to visually highlight and annotate each exception identified. There were
zero false alarms; each of those exceptions was attributed to either a problem in the firewall con-
figurations or an expansion of the policy.
Ultimately, NetAPT helped produce comprehensive and highly visual reports that helped our
industrial partner prove that their network was in compliance with the NERC CIP standards. They
were able to correct some problems with their configurations, and the entire process took consid-
erably less time than the usual two-week audit process, the latter being significantly less compre-
hensive, as it was done on selected parts of the network by hand.
9.2 Automatic Generation of Representative Networks
So far, we have demonstrated the efficacy of our techniques on several test cases. However, there
is a need for a more comprehensive experimental study of the performance and scalability of our
analysis and topology inference algorithms, and the completeness of the inference algorithms.
We have collaborated with multiple industrial partners during our research, and have obtained
access to a number of real-world network topologies and firewall rule-sets through those collabora-
tions. The majority of those networks are SCADA networks representing process control systems
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and the associated enterprise sub-networks. However, for several reasons, those data sets are not
sufficient for comprehensive experimental studies.
The real-world network topologies are limited to specific data points and do not immediately
allow us to study how our algorithms scale when the study parameters are varied in particular
ways. Second, we have observed that while networks share certain essential characteristics, the
larger networks in our data set were not obtained simply by siloing and replicating the smaller
networks in the data set. Hence, a trivial scaling technique was not possible.
We were also under nondisclosure agreements with our industrial partners that severely limited
the extent to which results of analysis of their networks could be publicly discussed. Those agree-
ments also allowed us to use the data sets only with explicitly permitted techniques, ruling out
new algorithms and mechanisms we may develop in the future. In addition, we wanted to have a
realistic benchmark that could be of use to other researchers.
For the reasons indicated above, we decided to develop an algorithm for generating random
network topologies and firewall rule-sets that captured the essential characteristics of a set of train-
ing topologies and corresponding rule-sets. We generated the benchmark topologies by varying
parameters such as numbers of sub-networks, access control devices (mostly firewalls), hosts and
applications deployed, and the rule-set size and complexity.
9.2.1 Related Work and Background
There has been considerable work on the generation of random networks. Those efforts have
been applied to multiple domains, including networks of computer systems, social networks, and
networks characterizing spread of infections. They are not directly applicable to our goals as they
have been too generic, and the generation models involved were not based on the learned structural
and flow (traffic) characteristics of a set of training networks. Still, several ideas that emerged from
those efforts motivated our algorithms.
In the Small World Experiment, Milgram sent a package to several randomly chosen people in
Wichita, Kansas, with instructions asking them to forward an enclosed letter to a target person,
identified by name and occupation, in Sharon, Massachusetts. The subjects were told that they
could mail the letter directly to the target person only if they knew him personally; otherwise they
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were instructed to send it, and the same instructions, to a relative or friend they thought would be
more likely to know the target person.
Many of the letters were never delivered, but for the ones that were the average path length—
the number of times the letters were forwarded—was about six. This result was taken to confirm
previous observations (and speculations) that the typical distance between any two people in a
social network is about “six degrees of separation.”
The conclusion was surprising, because most people expect social networks to be localized—
people tend to live near their friends—and in a graph with local connections, path lengths tend to
increase in proportion to geographical distance.
In 1998, Duncan Watts and Steven Strogatz published a paper in Nature, “Collective Dynamics
of ‘Small-World’ Networks,” [57] that proposed an explanation for the small-world phenomenon.
They started with two kinds of graph that were well-understood: random graphs and regular
graphs. They looked at two properties of these graphs: clustering and path length.
Clustering is a measure of the “cliquishness” of the graph. In a graph, a clique is a subset of
nodes that are all connected to each other; in a social network, a clique is a set of friends
who all know each other. Watts and Strogatz defined a clustering coefficient that quantifies
the likelihood that two nodes that are connected to the same node are also connected to each
other.
Path length is a measure of the average distance between two nodes, which corresponds to the
degrees of separation in a social network.
Their initial result was what might be expected: regular graphs have high clustering and high
path lengths; random graphs with the same size tend to have low clustering and low path lengths.
So neither of these is a good model of social networks, which seem to combine high clustering
with short path lengths.
Watts and Strogatz’s goal was to create a generative model of a social network. A generative
model tries to explain a phenomenon by modeling the process that builds or leads to the phe-
nomenon. In this case they proposed a process for building small-world graphs:
1. Start with a regular graph with n nodes and degree k. (Watts and Strogatz start with a ring
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lattice, which is a kind of regular graph. One could replicate their experiment or instead try
a graph that is regular but not a ring lattice.)
2. Choose a subset of the edges in the graph and “rewire” them by replacing them with random
edges. Again, one could replicate the procedure described in the paper or experiment with
alternatives.
The proportion of edges that are rewired is a parameter, p, that controls how random the graph
is. With p = 0, the graph is regular; with p = 1, it is random.
Watts and Strogatz found that small values of p yield graphs with high clustering, like a regular
graph, and low path lengths, like a random graph.
Zipf’s law [58] describes a relationship between the frequencies and ranks of words in natural
languages. The “frequency” of a word is the number of times it appears in a body of work. The
“rank” of a word is its position in a list of words sorted by frequency: the most common word has
rank 1, the second most common has rank 2, and so forth.
Specifically, Zipf’s law predicts that the frequency, f , of the word with rank r is:
f = cr−s
where s and c are parameters that depend on the language and the text.
If we take the logarithm of both sides of this equation, we get:
log f = logc− s logr
So if we plot log f versus logr, we should get a straight line with slope −s and intercept logc.
The Pareto distribution [59] is named after the economist Vilfredo Pareto, who used it to describe
the distribution of wealth. Since then, people have used it to describe phenomena in the natural
and social sciences, including sizes of cities and towns, sand particles and meteorites, forest fires,
and earthquakes.
The Pareto distribution is characterized by a CDF with the following form:
CDF(x) = 1−
(
x
xm
)−α
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The parameters xm and α determine the location and shape of the distribution. xm is the mini-
mum possible quantity.
Values from a Pareto distribution often have these properties:
Long tail: Pareto distributions contain many small values and a few very large ones.
80/20 rule: The large values in a Pareto distribution are so large that they make up a dispropor-
tionate share of the total. In the context of wealth, the 80/20 rule says that 20% of the people
own 80% of the wealth.
Scale-free: Short-tailed distributions are centered around a typical size, which is called a “scale.”
For example, the great majority of adult humans are between 100 and 200 cm in height, so
we could say that the scale of human height is a few hundred centimeters. But for long-tailed
distributions, there is no similar range (bounded by a factor of two) that contains the bulk of
the distribution. So we say that these distributions are “scale-free.”
To get a sense of the difference between the Pareto and Gaussian distributions, imagine what
the world would be like if the distribution of human height were Pareto.
The equation for the CCDF is:
y = 1−CDF(x)∼
(
x
xm
)−α
Taking the log of both sides yields:
logy∼−α(logx− logxm)
So if one plots logy versus logx, the result should look like a straight line with slope −α and
intercept α logxm.
One can measure the degree (number of connections) of each node and compute P(k), the prob-
ability that a vertex has degree k; then one can plot P(k) versus k on a log-log scale. The tail of the
plot fits a straight line, so one can conclude that it obeys a power law; that is, as k gets large, P(k)
is asymptotic to k−γ , where γ is a parameter that determines the rate of decay.
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Baraba´si and Albert [60] also propose a model that generates random graphs with the same
property. The essential features of the model, which distinguish it from the Erdos-Renyi model
and the Watts-Strogatz model, are:
Growth: Instead of starting with a fixed number of vertices, Barabasi and Albert start with a small
graph and add vertices gradually.
Preferential attachment: When a new edge is created, it is more likely to connect to a vertex that
already has a large number of edges. This “rich get richer” effect is characteristic of the
growth patterns of some real-world networks.
Finally, one can show that graphs generated by this model have a distribution of degrees that
obeys a power law. Graphs that have this property are sometimes called scale-free networks. That
name can be confusing, because it is the distribution of degrees that is scale-free, not the network.
In order to maximize confusion, distributions that obey the power law are sometimes called
scaling distributions because they are invariant under a change of scale. That means that if one
changes the units in which the quantities are expressed, the slope parameter, γ , doesn’t change.
At this point, we have seen three phenomena that yield a straight line on a log-log plot:
• Zipf plot: Frequency as a function of rank.
• Pareto CCDF: The complementary CDF of a Pareto distribution.
• Power law plot: A histogram of frequencies.
The similarity in these plots is not a coincidence; these visual tests are closely related.
Starting with a power-law distribution, we have:
P(k)∼ k−γ
If we choose a random node in a scale-free network, P(k) is the probability that its degree equals
k.
The cumulative distribution function, CDF(k), is the probability that the degree is less than or
equal to k, so we can get that by summation:
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CDF(k) =
k
∑
i=0
P(i)
For large values of k, we can approximate the summation with an integral:
k
∑
i=0
i−γ ∼
∫ k
i=0
i−γ =
1
γ−1(1− k
−γ+1)
To make this a proper CDF, we could normalize it so that it goes to 1 as k goes to infinity, but
that’s not necessary, because all we need to know is:
CDF(k)∼ 1− k−γ+1
That shows that the distribution of k is asymptotic to a Pareto distribution with α = γ−1.
f = cr−s
where f is the frequency of the word with rank r. Inverting this relationship yields:
r = ( f/c)−1/s
Now, subtracting 1 and dividing through by the number of different words, n, we get
r−1
n
=
( f/c)−1/s
n
− 1
n
,
which is only interesting because if r is the rank of a word, then (r−1)/n is the fraction of words
with lower ranks, which is the fraction of words with higher frequency, which is the CCDF of the
distribution of frequencies:
CCDF(x) =
( f/c)−1/s
n
− 1
n
To characterize the asymptotic behavior for large n, we can ignore c and 1/n, which yields:
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Figure 9.3: Evaluating NetAPT Using Randomly Generated Networks
CCDF(x)∼ f−1/s
That shows that if a set of words obeys Zipf’s law, the distribution of their frequencies is asymp-
totic to a Pareto distribution with α = 1/s.
So the three visual tests are mathematically equivalent; a dataset that passes one test will pass
all three. But as a practical matter, the power law plot is noisier than the other two, because it is
the derivative of the CCDF.
The Zipf and CCDF plots are more robust, but Zipf’s law is only applicable to discrete data (like
words), not continuous quantities. CCDF plots work with both. For these reasons—robustness and
generality—we used CCDFs where applicable in our own algorithms.
9.2.2 Overall Approach
Our overall approach to comprehensive experimental evaluation of NetAPT is shown in Figure 9.3.
We made the following observations from the empirical data sets to which we had access:
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• Networks are organized into sub-networks, with the most atomic of the sub-networks repre-
senting hosts on a single local area network.
• Sub-networks that collectively form the overall network can be classified into a small set of
classes or types. For example, the networks in Figure 9.1 can be classified into the types:
“corporate network,” “DMZ,” and “control network.”
• The networks support a finite set of applications, and the firewall rule-sets determine the
flow of traffic to and from the deployed applications.
Based on the above observations, we first learn the characteristics of the training topologies.
We capture the network topology structure by using an algorithm to classify the sub-networks in
the training topologies into various types or classes, and identifying the ways in which the sub-
networks of various types connect with each other. We capture the connectivity and network traffic
flows implied by the firewall rule-sets by developing traffic profiles for each deployed application
or service.
The generation algorithm then uses the probability distributions stored and associated with the
sub-network classes and application profiles to generate samples for new networks and rule-sets.
9.2.3 Learning Characteristics
Characterizing Network Topology Structure
As stated earlier, the first step in learning the structural characteristics of a set of training topologies
to classify the types of sub-networks present in those topologies. We achieve that by performing
an automatic hierarchical classification of networks.
We use a variation of agglomerative clustering to obtain our classification. The algorithm starts
with individual sub-networks in our data set and successively merges similar sub-networks into
clusters. Clusters then represent classes or types of network with varying degrees of resolution
or abstraction. Figure 9.4 shows an example partial dendrogram resulting from the agglomerative
clustering of the network shown in Figure 9.1. Note that the labels shown in Figure 9.4 have been
added for ease of exposition, and are not automatically generated by our algorithm.
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Figure 9.5 shows the information stored with each node in the dendrogram. In particular, we
store:
• List of services hosted or provided by a sub-network of the type represented by the node,
along with the likelihood of each service being hosted.
• List of external services accessed by a sub-network of the type represented by the node,
along with the likelihood of each service being accessed.
• Relative size of a sub-network of the type represented by the node. It is the likely ratio of
the number of hosts in a sub-network of this type to the total number of hosts in the overall
network.
• Relative frequency of the occurrence of a sub-network of the type represented by the node.
It is the likely ratio of the number of sub-networks of this type to the total number of sub-
networks that form the overall network.
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• Edge probabilities: for each node in the dendrogram, the probability that a sub-network of
the type represented by that node is connected to a sub-network of the type represented by
this node. The edge probabilities for all the nodes are stored in a single adjacency-matrix-
like representation, that we call the connectivity matrix.
• Merge distance between the two child nodes of the current node, whose merge (or clustering)
produced this node. We describe the metrics and calculations for the merge distance below.
To facilitate clustering of nodes through merges, we assign a traffic profile vector to each node.
Definition 12. Let Sin = {s1in, . . . ,snin} be the set of all possible services provided by a sub-network
in our training data set. Let Sout = {s1out , . . . ,smout} be the set of all possible services accessed by a
sub-network in our training data set. We consider an (n+m) dimensional vector space that has a
dimension associated with members of Sin and Sout . In this vector space, a given cluster node is
assigned the Cartesian coordinates representing the likelihood of the corresponding service being
provided or accessed by a sub-network of the type represented by the cluster node. Those (n+m)
Cartesian coordinates define a cluster node’s traffic profile vector.
We use the traffic profile vectors to determine similarity of nodes and use that information to
identify the nodes that can be clustered.
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The clustering algorithm has the following steps:
1. We identify the individual sub-networks from the XML-based representation of the training
network topologies. We can do so by enumerating all the Network elements in the DTD
shown in Figure 4.3. Those sub-networks form the leaves or the atomic clusters of our
hierarchical classification dendrogram. Each sub-network is initially labeled with a set of
keywords. That set is a union of any user-specified description, interface name or descrip-
tions for the sub-network in the firewalls connected to the sub-network, and the names of the
object-group(s) of which sub-network may be a part.
2. We perform an initial set of merges among the clusters identified in Step 1. We merge the
clusters that represent sub-networks with similar labels. We define certain label strings to
be equivalent to further aid the merge process (e.g., DMZ is equivalent, to “Demilitarized
Zone”). We set the merge distance field in the merged node to 0.
3. We merge the two clusters with the least traffic profile distance, based on the profiles of the
incoming and outgoing traffic. The traffic profile distance is the Euclidean distance between
the traffic profile vectors representing the two nodes. We store the traffic profile distance
between the two merging nodes in the merge distance field of the merged node. We update
the other fields in the merged node with appropriate weighted means of the corresponding
values for the merging nodes. We also expand and update the connectivity matrix with rows
and columns associated with the newly formed merged node.
4. We repeat step 3 above until there is only one node left.
At the end of the above steps, we have a dendrogram representing a hierarchical classification
of sub-network types.
Characterizing Traffic Patterns
We develop application profiles to capture the essential characteristics of the traffic patterns ob-
served in the training data set.
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We begin by identifying the different applications being used on the networks in the training data
set. We construct an initial set of applications, adding a member for each unique destination port
on which a service receives traffic. We then compact this set by merging together members with
the same or similar object group names, aliases, identifiers, and descriptions. We allow for further
merging based on user input. During the merge operations, we keep track of the set of destination
ports on which each application represented by the merged member can receive traffic. The final
compacted set, A , represents the applications to be profiled. Some examples that we identified
from our real-world topologies include remote access using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)
and data historian services using SQL. In all the tests with the real-world training data, we have
found that |A | is usually around 12, and never exceeds 20.
For each application in A , we look at paths through the network that end up accessing that
application, and we associate with that application a set of the unique path lengths encountered,
where each member of the set also stores the number of times that a path of that length was seen.
We also calculate and store the probabilities of different combinations of services being de-
ployed on the same host. While this is a set of size O(2|A |), that size is not likely to be a problem,
as we use a sparse data structure (storing only the nonzero probabilities), and |A | ≤ 20 in our
empirical observations.
9.2.4 Generation Algorithm
Generating Topology
We now describe the generation algorithm (Generation algorithms are also known referred to as
generative models in the literature.) that we use to generate random network topologies.
As noted in Section 9.2.1, the prior efforts, such as the Watts-Strogatz model [57] and the
Baraba´si-Albert model [60] for scale-free networks, are too generic, and do not capture the es-
sential characteristics of our real-world training data set.
The generation algorithm requires three sets of input:
• List of services or applications to be deployed.
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• Number of sub-networks (separated by layer 3 devices and belonging to a single LAN) that
form the overall network.
• Overall size of the network as characterized by the number of hosts.
Given the above input, the first step in the generation algorithm is to select the sub-network
classes that would form the overall network topology.
We consider the dendrogram representing the hierarchical classification of sub-network types
(e.g., Figure 9.4). We initialize the “distance threshold,” d, to be the merge distance stored in the
root node of the dendrogram.
We know from the description of the agglomerative clustering algorithm above that the merge
distance stored at the root node is the largest of all merge distances stored at the nodes of the
dendrogram. We then successively reduce the distance threshold, selecting the next largest merge
distance in each step. At each step i, we consider the nodes whose merge distances are greater than
or equal to the current value of d. Let those nodes be represented by Ni. Together, the nodes in Ni
form Gi, a sub-tree rooted at the root of the dendrogram.
We continue to decrease d until either the number of leaf nodes in Gi is greater than or equal
to the number of sub-networks provided as input to the algorithm, or we exhaust the dendrogram.
Let G f denote the sub-tree in that final step.
We randomly select a set of nodes in G f that collectively cover the input set of services deployed
to indicate NC, the set of sub-network classes that will be represented in the generated topology.
The probability that a node is selected is a function of the value of the node’s relative frequency
field and the node’s “resolution” (graph-theoretic distance from the root node of the dendrogram),
with nodes with higher frequencies and higher resolutions being more likely to be selected. If a
node is selected for NC, none of its descendant nodes in the hierarchy dendrogram are selected for
NC.
Once we have selected the classes (or types) of sub-networks to be represented, we instantiate
the actual sub-networks. We use the normalized relative frequency of occurrence of the sub-
network classes in NC to determine the number of sub-networks of each type instantiated. We use
NI to denote the set of instantiated sub-networks.
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The next step in the generating algorithm is to assign applications (services deployed and ac-
cessed) to each instantiated sub-network. For each sub-network in NI , we initially assign services
by sampling from the probabilities of the services hosted and accessed, stored at the node clus-
ter (sub-network type) of which the sub-network is an instance. After that initial assignment of
services, we look for applications provided as input to the generating algorithm that were not de-
ployed in the initial assignment. We attempt to assign each of those applications to one or more
sub-networks in NI based on the relevant probabilities stored with the corresponding node cluster
(sub-network type).
We connect the instantiated sub-networks using an iterative algorithm that adds edges to the
topology being generated based on the various probability distributions associated with sub-network
types, either explicitly or implicitly.
• We sample from the connectivity matrix associated with the hierarchical classification of
the sub-network types to add an initial set of edges. In other words, we use the likelihood
of single-hop connection between node clusters to determine when to add edges between
instantiated sub-networks of those types.
• For each deployed application, starting with the application for which the path lengths stored
in its profile have the lowest mode:
– We sample a path length based on the discrete distribution stored in the application’s
profile, say l.
– We add an edge from a sub-network that accesses the application to a sub-network
at the distance of (l− 1) from a sub-network that hosts the application. If multiple
qualifying sub-networks that host the application are present, we pick the one that has
the highest current degree. This introduces certain scale-free characteristics into the
network being generated.
We now place firewalls on certain communication paths (edges) in our network. Consider a
clique with n nodes (sub-networks), that has m edges between to sub-networks in the clique and
sub-networks not in the clique. We replace such a clique in our network topology with a firewall
with (n+m) interfaces, such that the firewall has an interface connected to each sub-network in
99
the clique, and an interface connected to each of the non-clique sub-networks that were connected
to the clique.
We populate the instantiated sub-networks with hosts based on information about the relative
size associated with the corresponding sub-network type and the overall size of the network re-
quested. We deploy the services that are assigned to an instantiated sub-network on individual
hosts in the sub-network by sampling from the stored probabilities of application combinations.
Generating Rule-Sets
Each time we add a path in the network topology during the algorithm described above, we store
information about the relevant traffic in a 4-D interval tree (similar to that used for representing
a TAS). After the algorithm has generated the network topology, we combine all the 4-D interval
trees into a single 4-D interval tree using efficient operations described in Section 4.2.1. We use
an extended version of the algorithms described in [43, 44] to instantiate a minimal set of firewall
rules for the individual firewalls that collectively produce precisely the traffic represented by the
combined 4-D interval tree.
If the generation parameters included the average rule-set size, we add additional “accept” rules
about the services explicitly mentioned in the input to the generation algorithm, and add “accept”
or “deny” rules for services not explicitly mentioned in the input parameters. Addition of these
rules does not affect access to the explicitly mentioned services. We continue to add such rules
until the requirements about the average rule-set size are met. Our algorithm biases the addition of
new rules to firewalls whose rule-set sizes are below the current average.
9.2.5 Concluding Remarks
We have described a framework for learning the essential characteristics of a set of training topolo-
gies and rule-sets and using those characteristics to generate “similar” random network topologies
and accompanying firewall rule-sets. We are currently working on generating benchmarks that can
be used for a comprehensive study of the algorithms implemented in NetAPT. We now describe
some of the ways such a benchmark can be constructed.
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We can study the performance of the exhaustive analysis algorithm on randomly generated net-
works that satisfy variety of criteria. For example, some of those criteria (or study parameters
given to the generation algorithm) can be:
• Network size goes from 2 to 1000 sub-networks, with fixed number of total hosts, while
using the minimal rule-set. The number of total hosts can be varied from 1000 to 10000.
• Network size goes from 2 to 1000 sub-networks, with proportional number of total hosts
(5x, 10x), while using the minimal rule-set.
• Vary the number of applications deployed for a fixed network size and minimal rule-set.
• Vary the average size of a rule-set for a fixed network size and a fixed set of applications
deployed.
All of the above examples would require generation of multiple sample networks for each data-
point and the analysis would have to be run until sufficiently narrow confidence intervals are
reached on the performance metrics being estimated.
We can study the worst-case performance of our analysis algorithms by using a “deny-all” global
policy. The exhaustive analysis against such a policy generates the connectivity map for the net-
work system being analyzed. To further refine, we can indicate the classes of misconfigurations
that are to be introduced, using the error model described in Chapter 2, along with the frequency
of each class of errors. We can then check against an automatically generated policy that only
permits the traffic destined for the deployed applications and denies everything else.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS
As networked systems continue to grow in scale and complexity, and are being used in increasingly
critical systems, it becomes important to make sure that they are protected from cyber attacks.
In particular, it is essential that the access to the critical resources on the network is carefully
controlled such that those resources are not exposed to attackers. Deployment of a large number
of distributed and layered access control mechanisms, such as firewalls, is the staple solution to
the problem of enforcing security policy. Hence, it is very important to ensure that all the access
control mechanisms work collectively in harmony, and that their complex interactions do not mask
subtle errors, introducing security vulnerabilities.
To provide system administrators and auditors with tools to help identify security problems that
would otherwise be difficult to detect without a considerable time investment, we have presented a
formal framework for the analysis of security configurations. We have presented the details of the
formalisms, as well as various data structures and algorithms used for a space and time efficient
implementation of the proposed framework. We have demonstrated the efficacy of our algorithms
through analytic complexity analyses and some preliminary experimental results. We have also
provided a formal description of the preliminary setup for performing statistical analysis of very
large and complex systems. In this chapter, we briefly review the work we have presented in this
dissertation and describe potential avenues for the expansion of our work, before concluding with
some final remarks.
10.1 Contribution Review
We presented formalisms for representing various aspects of the problem, namely the global policy
and the network system, where the latter is characterized by the network topology and the rule-sets
102
of all the firewalls on the network. We provided an XML-based policy specification language, that
was proven to be at least as expressive as LTL. Our policy specification language strikes a balance
between human-readability (that often leads to verbosity) and a sound mathematical basis (that
allows formal reasoning). We provided a unified XML-based schema for representing rule-sets
from a variety of sources, including multiple models and makes of firewalls and operating system-
based mechanisms. We also provided a feature-rich XML-based representation of the network
topology.
Once we were able to characterize the inputs to our analysis algorithms, using the formalisms
described above, we presented the multilayered rule-graph, a specialized data structure that we use
to facilitate efficient exploration of paths through the network while checking for policy compli-
ance and inconsistencies.
We presented a complete classification of possible errors that can be found in firewall rule-sets
due internal inconsistencies and violations of a user-specified global access policy. We next pre-
sented an efficient algorithms for a comprehensive exhaustive analysis of the policy implemented
in a networked system (firewall rule-sets) for compliance with a specification of the global access
policy. That algorithm enumerates all the internal inconsistencies found in rule-sets, lists all the
paths through the network that result in violation of some aspect of the global policy specification,
and for those violating paths, identifies the small set of likely root causes (rules that were miscon-
figured, resulting in that paths that violate the global policy). We explored ways to further optimize
the performance for the exhaustive analysis algorithm and provide analytic evaluation in the form
of a space and time complexity analysis.
Exhaustive analysis has its limitations as the system being analyzed scale and become more
complex. That is especially true if we include operating system-based access control mechanisms.
To handle such cases, we introduced an importance sampling-based statistical analysis algorithm.
We provided a formal description of the algorithm and included some assurances about the vari-
ance reduction achieved by the algorithm. The statistical analysis either results in a sample set of
violations with a quantitation estimate of the remainder, or a confidence measure of there being no
violations.
During our interaction with several industry partners over the course of our research, we ob-
served the lack of detailed maps of the network topology, which is an essential input for the analy-
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sis algorithms. To alleviate that issue, we presented an algorithm to automatically infer the network
topology from the configurations of the firewalls and other layer 3 devices in the network.
We presented a brief description of the Network Access Policy Tool that implements our frame-
work. We then applied NetAPT to various test cases obtained through industrial collaboration,
and demonstrated that our methods were of great use to real system administrators and auditors in
identifying problems in the configurations of their access control devices. Finally, we presented a
framework for learning the essential characteristics of our real-world network topology data sets,
and using those characteristics to create a benchmark suite of automatically generated represen-
tative random networks and firewall rule-sets of varying sizes and complexity. We indicated how
the benchmark can be used for a comprehensive study of the performance and correctness of our
algorithms.
10.2 Future Avenues
10.2.1 Fast Incremental Change Analysis
This task entails the design and implementation of algorithms to perform a fast analysis for check-
ing compliance when the changes in the configuration are small and incremental, using results
from the comprehensive exhaustive analysis of the configuration before the changes. Furthermore,
studies can be made to show how the gap between the performance of the incremental-change
analysis and the full exhaustive analysis narrows as the changes to the configuration increase in
number and spatial distribution.
10.2.2 Statistical Analysis
In Chapter 6, we provided the formal framework that includes the measure (global compliance
metric, and its various projections such as the number of violations and the fraction of possible
traffic in violation) and the base statistical analysis algorithm that uses importance sampling. The
biasing heuristic and stopping criteria parameterize the algorithm.
Following research directions can be explored to further extend the work on statistical analysis:
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• A more fully-realized confidence measure computation mechanism, based on inverse Bayesian
analysis, for the case where zero violations are reported when the stopping criteria is reached.
• Formalization of various classes of biasing heuristics and proofs of guaranteed rapid conver-
gence, in the form of bounded relative error and/or asymptotic optimality, for each class of
heuristics (e.g., graph-theoretic-distance-based, or user annotated and incremental configu-
ration change based).
• Experimental proofs of accuracy and performance for different biasing heuristics, supple-
menting the analytic proofs when present. Our plan is to use the random topology and
rule-sets generated by the mechanism mentioned earlier in this section for the experimental
results.
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APPENDIX A
TOPOLOGY INFERENCE DETAILS
A.1 Goal
The goal is to infer the underlying network topology from a variety of indirect information sources,
such as the native configuration files for various Layer 3 devices, outputting the topology in XML
that conforms to NetAPT’s topology schema.
Currently, the only input information sources considered are the configuration files for Cisco
PIX (v 6.x and 7.x) and ASA (v 8.x) series of firewalls and network security devices, Linux iptables
firewall, and the Checkpoint UTM firewall.
A.2 Top-Level Approach
At the highest level, the flowchart shown in Figure A.1 summarizes how the NetAPT functions,
with the sections relevant to topology inference highlighted:
The first step is to obtain the required input. As shown in Figure A.1, the tool can take infor-
mation about the location of various firewalls (their IP addresses) and ways to establish secure
connections to them (login name and password for users with sufficient read privileges for estab-
lishing ssh connections), and download the latest configuration information from the devices in
their native format (PIX OS v 6.x, 7.x, or 8.x in the current implementation).
The other option is for the users of NetAPT to use third-party tools to obtain the configuration
files. For example, the RANCID (Really Awesome New Cisco confIg Differ) tool can be used
to maintain a repository of the latest configuration files for Cisco network devices. The tool uses
CVS to maintain a history of changes. It manages the process of logging into the devices, running
various commands to get the configuration information, and saving the said information in the
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Figure A.1: Topology Inference
repository (duplicating a lot of NetAPT’s functionality in this regard, except also using CVS). In
such a scenario, NetAPT’s engine simply needs to be invoked with the location of the repository
on the local disk and it will proceed from there instead of trying to obtain the information itself.
A.3 Overall Topology Inference Framework
The main elements of the overall framework are:
1. Topology database: This database stores information about the myriad topology elements
collected from different input sources. The input sources can potentially include firewall
configuration files, dumps from nmap scans, and log files from routers and switches, to name
a few. The framework includes scripts that provide the necessary interface to the database,
while managing its internal integrity and conformance to the relational DB schema set out
for it.
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2. Input scripts: These scripts provide a modular and extensible way to parse the raw informa-
tion from the various input sources and populate the topology database.
3. Output scripts: These scripts read the information contained in the topology database and
produce “views” of the information in various formats that can be easily visualized and
processed by other tools (or other components of the tool, in NetAPT’s case). These formats
include GraphML, Graphviz, and NetAPT’s own topology XML schema.
A.3.1 Topology Database and Management Scripts
This functionality is currently provided using SQLite (http://www.sqlite.org/) for the relational
DB and ANTFARM (http://antfarm.rubyforge.org/) for DB management. As a result, most the
scripts are written in the Ruby scripting language and use the Ruby on Rails framework for DB
integration.
A brief introduction to the Active Record terminology from Ruby on Rails is needed. An Active
Record is an object that wraps a row in a database table or view, encapsulates the database access,
and adds domain logic on the data. To summarize briefly:
1. classes typically represent/encapsulate SQL tables,
2. objects are the rows in the tables,
3. base attributes in each class are the columns in the corresponding tables, and
4. association methods in each class define foreign keys for the corresponding table (one-to-
many, one-to-one, or many-to-one relations between rows of one table to rows of another
table).
Furthermore, one can define methods that are to be performed before and immediately after an
active record is created or updated, among other ways of manipulating them.
The database schema contains the following (relevant) tables/classes.
• Node
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This represents a node (i.e., a single device) in the topology; e.g., a firewall, a host, or a
network switch. It has the following base attributes:
– Name
– Certainty factor: the confidence of the inference algorithm that the node actually exists
in the topology (a probability between 0 and 1).
– Device type: these are typically things like “firewall,” “host,” “switch,” etc.
– Custom: to store any specialized/extra information (currently unused).
It has the following association methods (which define references to other classes):
– One-to-many associations: layer2 interface, layer3 interface (via layer2 interface), ser-
vice
– One-to-one associations: operating system
• Layer2 interface
This represents a layer2 (i.e., MAC) network interface. Base attributes:
– Node id: reference to the node to which this interface belongs.
– Certainty factor
– Media type: e.g., Ethernet or 802.11b
– Custom
Associations:
– One-to-many: layer3 interface
– One-to-one: ethernet interface
– Belongs-to (Many-to-one): node
• Ethernet interface
Base attributes:
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– Address
– Custom
Associations:
– Belongs-to (One-to-one): layer2 interface
• Layer3 interface
This represents a Layer 3 network interface (e.g., an IP address associated with a NIC). In
general, though, any Layer 3 network protocol (may or may not be IP) can be used.
Base attributes:
– Certainty factor
– Protocol: Layer 3 network protocol being used (e.g., IP)
– Custom
Associations:
– One-to-one: ip interface
– Belongs-to (many-to-one): layer2 interface, layer3 network
• Ip interface
This represents an IP address bound to a NIC. Base attributes:
– Address: the IP address associated with this interface.
– Virtual: a Boolean variable that indicates whether the IP address is associated with a
virtual host in a firewall (used for static NAT mappings) rather than an actual physical
device.
– Custom
Associations:
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– Belongs-to (one-to-one): layer3 interface
• Layer3 network
This represents a collection of layer 3 interfaces that form a single LAN. Base attributes:
– Certainty factor
– Protocol
– Custom
Associations
– One-to-many: layer3 interface
– One-to-one: ip network
• Ip network
This represents a set of IP interfaces that form a single LAN (i.e., an IP-based Layer 3
network). Base attributes:
– Address: CIDR-based address notation (network address/prefix length, e.g., 192.168.0.0/16)
– Private: a Boolean variable that indicates whether the network is private (i.e., a subset
of one of the following IP address spaces is being used: 10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, or
172.16.0.0/16).
– Private network id: used to distinguish among multiple private networks with the same
address
– Custom
Associations:
– Belongs-to (one-to-one): layer3 network
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The attributes (both base and associated) can typically be accessed in an object-oriented fash-
ion, e.g., node obj.layer3 interfaces would return a list of all the layer3 interfaces objects that are
associated with the node represented by node obj.
Note that ANTFARM bundles each class mentioned above with a variety of methods for their
manipulation, including those that are to be performed before and immediately after an active
record object is created or updated. The ones that are relevant to our algorithm and/or were over-
written by us are described in the Input scripts section below.
A.3.2 Input Scripts
This section describes the input scripts used to parse configuration information from multiple Cisco
PIX/ASA devices and populate the database described above.
Topology Elements
We assume the network topology to contain the following elements:
1. Hosts: devices typically with one interface (and associated IP address), though we support
hosts with multiple interfaces.
2. Networks: a collection of hosts, representing a LAN, such that the constituent hosts can talk
to each other without the need for Layer 3 routing.
3. Firewalls: devices with multiple (at least 2) interfaces, each connected to a network.
4. Switches: devices connected to multiple (at least 2) networks, and able to route traffic
between any pair (typically represents a Layer 3 router). For switches, unlike firewalls, we
may have information about only some of the associated interfaces. (Typically, a switch
should have one interface for each connected network.)
A network is “primary” with respect to a firewall if it is directly connected to it, and “secondary”
if it is connected to the firewall via a series of switches.
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“Custom” Attribute
Our inference algorithms use the custom attributes associated with the various DB tables for a
variety of purposes. The following is a description of what the strings assigned to that field mean
in different contexts.
1. Ip interface
(a) If the interface belongs to a firewall, it stores the description string associated with
that interface, if any. When defining the details of an interface in PIX (v7.x) and
ASA devices, one can also provide a description string elaborating the purpose of the
interface. Our algorithm assumes that the description strings provide details about
the network to which the interface is connected, and thus can be used in determining
whether networks with similar addresses connected to different firewalls are actually
one and the same, and thus can be merged and stored as one network in the database.
(b) If the interface belongs to a switch (router), it stores the list of addresses (CIDR) of
the networks switched/routed via that device. (Addresses are stored as a “:” delimited
string.)
(c) For all other contexts (i.e., hosts), the field is empty.
2. Ip network
• Names of the firewalls to which this network is connected (as primary or secondary).
Again, stored as a “:” delimited string.
3. Layer3 network
• List of the firewall interface description strings for all the firewalls connected to this
network (as primary or secondary, i.e., connected via a path that may include switches,
but not any other firewalls).
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Relevant Active Record Manipulation Functions
These are some of the functions that are relevant to the description of the main algorithm. The
format is <return type> <function name> (<parameters>).
Class Layer3 network
static Boolean desc_strings_intersect(String str1, String str2)
This function takes as input two sets of strings, each represented as
a ":" delimited string. For example, the set {firewall1, firewall2}
would berepresented as the string "firewall1:firewall2", and returns
true if the two sets intersect. Note that this is a static/class
function and not a member function.
static String desc strings_union(String str1, String str2)
This function takes as input two sets of strings, each represented as a
":" delimited string, and returns their set union, also represented as
a ":" delimited string.
static Layer3_network network_containing(String ip_net_cidr,
String firewall_names_string)
This function takes as input the address of a network (as a CIDR string)
and a list of firewall names to which the network is connected. It
returns the database-stored network for which the argument is a
sub-network, and is also connected to one of the firewalls to which
this network is connected.
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ip_networks = List of all ip_network objects stored in the database
for each ip_network object, ip_net, in ip_networks
if ip_net_cidr is a subset of ip_net and
desc_strings_intersect(firewall_names_string, ip_net.custom)
ip_net.custom = desc_strings_union(firewall_names_string,
ip_net.custom)
update ip_net in the DB
return the layer3_network associated with the ip_network
ip_net
else return nil
static Layer3_network network_addressed_exact(String ip_net_cidr,
String firewall_names_string)
Similar to network_containing() above, except that it returns an exact
match (if present) for argument network, and not a strict superset.
static Void merge(Layer3_network l3n)
Merges any of the networks currently contained in the database that ought
to be subsumed by the argument network into the said network. Note that
this is a static/class function and not a member function.
sub_networks = List of all layer3_networks in the DB that are
subsets l3n (simply based on network address)
for each sub_network in sub_networks
if sub_network != l3n and
desc_strings_intersect(sub_network.custom, l3n.custom)
description string of one of the firewalls connected
115
to each of the networks has the same description for the
network.
Move all layer3_interface objects contained within sub_network to l3n
l3n.ip_network.custom = desc_strings_union
(l3n.ip_network.custom,
sub_network.ip_network.custom)
l3n.custom = desc_strings_union (l3n.custom,
sub_network.custom)
update l3n in the database
destroy sub_network also destroys the corresponding
sub_newtork.ip_network object
class Ip_interface
Void create_layer3_interface()
Called whenever a new Ip_interface is created. Creates a new
layer3_interface record associated with (has a one-to-one
mapping with) this ip_interface record.
Among other things, calls create_ip_network() and assigns the return
value as the layer3_network associated with the newly created
layer3_interface.
Layer3_network create_ip_network()
Called whenever a new ip_interface is created. It checks to see
whether a network already exists that should contain this interface.
If one does not, it creates a small one that does. It only looks
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for the networks that are connected to the firewall whose config is
currently being parsed.
l3n = Layer3_network.network_containing(address of this interface,
name of the firewall currently being parsed)
if l3n is nil
create a small, /29, network containing the address of this
interface, and assign it to l3n
return l3n
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fw hostname hostname of the firewall being parsed
pix version PIX OS main version number (6, 7, or 8)
ip sec peers list of ipsec peers for VPN tunnels, obtained from the
crypto map command
interfaces wo desc list of the addresses (and the network mask of the connected network)
of the firewall interfaces that have no description strings
interfaces w desc list of the addresses (and network mask of the connected networks)
of the firewall interfaces that also have a description string
description strings list of the description strings for the interfaces in “interfaces w desc”
list, in the same order as that list
static nat actual list of local/actual IP addresses from static NAT mappings
(from static commands)
static nat virtual list of global/virtual IP addresses from static NAT mappings
(from static commands)
net obj ips list of host IP addresses from network object host commands
(object group definitions)
access list ips list of addresses (and network masks) obtained from access-list
commands (either as sources or destinations in various rules)
host alias ips list of IP addresses obtained from the name command that
defines string aliases for IPs
host alias map a hash that maps aliases to IPs, as defined by the name command
gateway ips list of gateways/switches (IPs) obtained from route
routed networks map a hash that maps each gateway IP to an array containing
the network address and mask of each network
that has that gateway in a route command
Table A.1: Lists and Strings Created During Input Parsing
Main input-parsing algorithm
The script takes as input the list of the paths to each of the firewall config files, or the path to the
directory where the files are stored. It then processes each of the files in succession by calling
the following function. This is a fairly high-level description. Some of the functionality may be
summarized in italicized comments rather than pseudo-code. The Cisco PIX OS commands are
italicized. (Full set of commands is available at [61].)
Parse(String path_to_file)
file = open(path_to_file, read)
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Define various regular expressions for matching different
commands in the PIX OS command-set.
For each line in file, match the regular expressions and
create the lists and strings in Table A.1 (some lists
require matching multiple regexps over multiple lines)
Care is taken to dereference name aliases when the occur in
place of IP addresses in route, static, access-list and other
commands.
close(file)
Process firewall interfaces
for each ip_address in interfaces_wo_desc
ip_if = new ip_interface object with the address ip_address
put ip_if in the node object named fw_hostname (create the node
if it doesnt already exist) and set its device_type as FW
save ip_if in the DB
Note that this will cause a call to
ip_if.create_layer3_interface -> ip_if.create_ip_network
as described above in the section on manipulation functions.
As a result, the network connected to the firewall interface
will be created and stored in the database as well.
for each ip_address in interfaces_w_desc
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description_str = corresponding entry in description_strings
ip_if = new ip_interface object with the address ip_address
put ip_if in the node object named fw_hostname (create the node
if it doesnt already exist) and set its device_type as "FW"
ip_if.custom = description_str
save ip_if in the DB
Again, corresponding networks (ip_network and layer3_network)
are created
update ip_if.layer3.interface.layer3_network.custom to
include description_str
The custom field of the layer3_network containing this
interface now includes the description associated with this
interface
Layer3_network.merge(ip_if.layer3_interface.layer3_network)
This merges all the networks in the DB that can be merged into
the newly created layer3_network, i.e., all those networks whose
address is a subset and at least one connected firewall had a
matching description to one of this networks description set.
See details of the merge function above.
Process network object groups
non_gateway_hosts = net_obj_ips gateway_ips /* set subtration */
for each ip_address in non_gateway_ips
ip_if = new ip_interface object with the address ip_address
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put ip_if in the node object named ip_address (create the node
if it doesnt already exist) and set its device_type as "HOST"
save ip_if in DB
This will cause the new ip_interface (and the corresponding
layer3_interface) to be added to the appropriate network
connected to the current firewall. See class ip_interface
manipulation functions above. This happens on all saves below.
Process IPs from name aliases, static commands and access-list
commands
other_ips = (host_alias_ips U static_nat_actual U access_list_ips)
(net_obj_ips U gateway_ips)
for each ip_address in other_ips
ip_if = new ip_interface object with the address ip_address
put ip_if in the node object named ip_address (create the node
if it doesnt already exist)
if an ip_interface record with the address ip_address doesnt
already exist in the DB, save ip_if in the DB
Mark virtual IPs from static commands
for each ip_address in static_nat_virtual
ip_if = new ip_interface object with the address ip_address
ip_if.virtual = true
put ip_if in the node object named ip_address (create the node
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if it doesnt already exist)
if an ip_interface record with the address ip_address doesnt
already exist in the DB, save ip_if in the DB
else set the virtual attribute of the existing ip_interface
record as true
Process gateways/switches
gateway_ips = gateway_ips ip_sec_peers
for each ip_address in gateway_ips
ip_if = new ip_interface object with the address ip_address
put ip_if in the node object named ip_address@fw_hostname (create
the node if it doesnt already exist) and set its device_type as
"SWITCH"
ip_if.custom = : delimited string containing list of network
addresses contained in routed_networks_map[ip_address]
save ip_if in the DB
Now we create ip_network records for each routed network for
this gateway
for each network_addr in routed_networks_map[ip_address]
l3_n = Layer3_network.network_addressed_exact(
network_addr, fw_hostname)
if l3_n is nil
ip_n = new ip_network object with the address
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network_addr
ip_n.custom = fw_hostname
save ip_n in the DB
This will also create the corresponding
layer3_network record
l3_n = ip_n.layer3_network
l3_n.custom = Layer3_network.desc_string_union(
l3_n.custom,
ip_if.layer3_interface.layer3_network.custom)
ip_if.layer3_interface_layer_newtork.custom = l3_n.custom
Weve updated the l3_n custom field to include
descriptions for the primary network that contains
the gateway (and vice versa). This way descriptions
carry-over from primary networks to the secondary
networks connected to them.
save l3_n in the DB
update ip_if.layer3_interface_layer_newtork in the DB
A.3.3 Output Scripts
The output scripts access the topology database populated over potentially multiple runs of the
input scripts and produce an XML description of the topology conforming to NetAPT’s topology
XML schema.
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Main output-generation algorithm
The script takes as input the path to the location where the generated topology XML file would
be stored (file extension .topo is used for these files). It can work in two modes: generate a
single topology file summarizing all the information contained in the DB, or generate one file
per connected component (in the graph-theoretic sense). In the latter case, the output file name
specified is used as the prefix and each connected component is a self-contained topology XML
file with names <prefix> 1.topo, <prefix> 2.topo, and so on.
The following are some of the lists that we use output generation algorithm.
• all networks: list of all Layer 3 networks in the DB
• all primary networks: list of all networks directly connected to a firewall
• all routed networks: list of all networks connected to router/switch
• all connected networks: list of all networks reachable from a firewall (directly or via one or
more switches)
• empty nws fws: map of addresses of the interfaces of firewalls connected to a network; only
primary networks with no hosts (or switches) have keys in the map
• empty routed networks: list of networks connected to a switch (but not the switch’s base
network) with no hosts
• all hosts: list of all hosts to be included in topology file
• all switches: list of all switches to be included in the topology file
• all firewalls: list of all firewalls
The steps of the algorithm are as follows.
Step 1: Generate list of all Layer 3 networks in the DB and various hash-maps for quick access to
their attributes.
Remember that there’s a one-to-one mapping between Layer3 network and ip network tables/records.
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for each l3_nw in DB.layer3_networks
add l3_nw to all_networks
store l3_nws details in hash-maps for quick access without
needing to refer to the DB repeatedly
For compactness of notation, from now on well refer to
details of layer3_network objects as simple member reference,
e.g., if l3_nw is such an object, its address and mask can be
accessed as l3_nw.address and l3_nw.netmask respectively. In
actuality though, it is more like networks_address_map[l3_nw]
etc.
Step 2: Generate a map of networks routed by each switch in the DB (a list of layer3 networks
mapped to each switch’s name) and lists of primary, routed, and connected networks
for each nd in DB.nodes
if nd.device_type == SWITCH
l3_if = node nds first layer3_interface (typically its only
interface that we have information about)
l3_nw = layer3_network that l3_if belongs to
(l3_if.layer3_network)
set the switchs name, sw_name, as nd.id (nds unique DB id),
add sw_name to all_switches and
store the switchs details in hash-maps
hereby referred to as sw_name.<attribute>, but actually
meaning switch_address_list[sw_name]; in particular,
sw_name.base_network = l3_nw, i.e., the network the known
switch interface belongs to
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add l3_nw to all_routed_networks, if not already present
routed_networks = list of networks routed by this switch obtained
from l3_if.ip_interface.custom string (note that this is
a list of CIDR network addresses)
fw_names_str = l3_nw.ip_network.custom
This string is a : delimited list of firewalls connected to
the switchs base network
for each rtd_nw_addr in routed_networks
rtd_l3_nw = layer3_network.network_addressed_exact(
rtd_nw_addr, fw_names_str)
This is now the appropriate layer3_network object/record
if rtd_l3_nw != l3_nw and rtd_l3_nw ? sw_name.routed_networks
add rtd_l3_nw to sw_name.routed_networks
add rtd_l3_nw to all_routed_networks, if not present
already
add rtd_l3_nw to empty_routed_networks, if not present
already
add sw_name to rtd_l3_nw.switches
if sw_name.routed_networks 6∈ {}
the route command in the firewall file didnt have the
switch routing just to its base network (l3_nw)
add sw_name to l3_nw.switches
if nd.device_type == FW
for each l3_if in nd.layer3_interfaces
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if l3_if.layer3_network 6∈ all_primary_networks
add l3_if.layer3_network to all_primary_networks
set empty_nws_fw[l3_if.layer3_network] as an empty list
Step 3: Generate the list of networks that will be included as <Network> elements in the generated
topology. Initialize various lists and arrays for storing information about those networks, and add
counter suffixes to the names of (different) networks that have the same address/mask.
all_connected_networks = all_primary_networks ? all_routed_networks
for each network in all_connected_networks
if the map network_name_counter has the key network.cidr_addr
this network was already encountered
name_counter = network_name_counter[network.cidr_addr]
network_name = network.cidr_addr + - # + name_counter
network_name_counter[network.cidr_addr] = name_counter + 1
else
network_name = network.cidr_addr
network_name_counter[network.cidr_addr] = 2
network_ids[network_name] = network
network_name[network] = network_name
hereby referred as network.name
Initialize various other hash-maps that store information
indexed by network_name; hereby referred to as
network_name.firewalls, network_name.hosts and
network_name.switches etc.
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Step 4: Generate list of hosts in the DB, and update lists and containing information about primary
and routed networks with no hosts. We are presuming that each host only has a single NIC.
for each nd in DB.nodes
for each l3_if in nd.layer3_interfaces
if (l3_if.layer3_network ? all_connected_networks and
l3_if.ip_interface.virtual == false)
if nd.device_type != FW and nd.device != SWITCH
node is a host
set host_id as l3_if and store details about the host in
various maps indexed by host_id (e.g, host_id.address)
add host_id to l3_if.layer3_network.name.hosts and
to all_hosts
if nd.device_type != FW
remove the entry for the index l3_if.layer3_network from
the map empty_nws_fw
remove l3_if.layer3_network from the list
empty_routed_networks
else
if empty_nws_fw contains the key l3_if.layer3_network
add l3_if.ip_interface.address to
empty_nws_fw[l3_if.layer3_network]
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Step 5: Generate list of dummy hosts for empty connected networks.
For NetAPT’s analysis to consider traffic ending or beginning in a network, it needs to have at least
one host.
Dummy hosts for primary networks
Assumption: less than 255 firewalls connected to each network
for each network in empty_nws_fw.keys
address_prefix = first three bytes of network.address
last_addr_byte = last byte of network.address
fw_last_bytes = sorted list of last bytes of the addresses in
the list empty_nws_fw[network]
we now find the first gap in the entries of fw_last_bytes
if fw_last_bytes.first > last_add_byte + 1
host_last_byte = last_addr_byte + 1
else
for each fw_last_byte in fw_last_bytes
if fw_last_byte + 1 6∈ fw_last_bytes
host_last_byte = fw_last_byte + 1
break_loop
global_DH_index++
host_address = address_prefix + host_last_byte
host_id = DH # + global_DH_index + "(" + host_address + ")"
add host_id to network.name.hosts and store details like
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host_address in maps indexed with host_id
add host_id to all_hosts
remove network from the list empty_routed_networks
Dummy hosts for empty routed networks
for each network in empty_routed_networks
address_prefix = first three bytes of network.address
last_addr_byte = last byte of network.address
host_last_byte = last_addr_byte + 1
global_DH_index++
host_address = address_prefix + host_last_byte
host_id = DH # + global_DH_index + "(" + host_address + ")"
add host_id to network.name.hosts and store details like
host_address in maps indexed with host_id
add host_id to all_hosts
Step 6: Generate the list of firewalls.
for each nd in DB.nodes
nd_processed_flag = false
initialize fw_id
for each l3_if in nd.layer3_interfaces
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if nd_processed_flag == false
if nd.device_type == "FW"
fw_id = nd.name
fw_id.name = "Firewall " + fw_id
nd_processed_flag = true
add l3_if.ip_interface.address to fw_id.addresses and
l3_if.layer3_network to fw_id.connected_networks and
fw_id to l3_if.layer3_network.name.firewalls
Step 7-1: Generate a single topology file.
This step is executed if the script was invoked indicating that only a single output file is to be
generated.
topo_file = open(file_name, "w")
output APT XML DTD to topo_file
Add <Network> elements
for each network in all_connected_networks
Output details from the various network hash-maps, such as
network.address, network.mask and network.name
Add <Host> elements
for each host in all_hosts
Output details from the various host hash-maps
Add <Switch> elements
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for each switch in all_switches
Output details from the various switch hash-maps, including
switch.routed_networks and switch.base_network
Add <Firewall> elements
for each firewall in all_firewalls
Output details from the various firewall hash-maps, including
firewall.addresses and firewall.networks
close topo_file
Step 7-2: Generate multiple topology files.
This step is executed if the script was invoked with the option of generating one file per (graph-
theoretic) connected component.
global_visited_firewalls = {}
file_counter = 1
for each firewall in all_firewalls
if firewall 6∈ global_visited_firewalls
local_file_name = file_name + "_" + file_counter
file_counter++
topo_file = open(local_file_name, "w")
Initialize local lists for elements to include in this
connected component
local_hosts = {}
local_networks = {}
local_firewalls = {}
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Initialize various lists to keep track of visited elements
local_visited_switches = {}
local_to_visit_switches ={}
local_to_visit_firewalls = {}
push: adding to the end of the list, pop: removing (and
returning) from the front of the list
local_to_visit_firewalls.push(firewall)
local_firewalls.push(firewall)
while local_to_visit_firewalls 6= {}
current_fw = local_to_visit_firewall.front
for each nw_name ∈ current_fw.networks
if nw_name 6∈ local_networks
local_networks.push(nw_name)
local_hosts = local_hosts ∪ nw_name.hosts
local_to_visit_switches = (local_to_visit_switches ∪
nw_name.switches) local_visited_switches
for each fw_to_visit in nw_name.firewalls
if (fw_to_visit 6= current_fw and
fw_to_visit 6∈ global_visited_firewalls)
local_to_visit_firewalls.push(fw_to_visit)
while local_to_visit_switches 6= {}
current_sw = local_to_visit_switches.pop
local_visited_switches.push(current_sw)
routed_networks = current_sw.routed_networks ∪
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{current_sw.base_network}
for each routed_network in routed_networks
nw_name = routed_network.name
if nw_name 6∈ local_networks
local_networks.push(nw_name)
local_hosts = local_hosts ∪ nw_name.hosts
local_to_visit_switches = (local_to_visit_switches ∪
nw_name.switches) local_visited_switches
for each fw_to_visit in nw_name.firewalls
if (fw_to_visit 6= current_fw and
fw_to_visit 6∈ global_visited_firewalls)
local_to_visit_firewalls.push(fw_to_visit)
visited_firewalls.push(current_fw)
local_firewalls = local_firewalls ∪ currrent_fw
local_to_visit_firewalls.pop
output APT XML DTD to topo_file
Add <Network> elements
for each network in all_connected_networks
Output details from the various network hash-maps, such as
network.address, network.mask and network.name
Add <Host> elements
for each host in all_hosts
Output details from the various host hash-maps
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Add <Switch> elements
for each switch in all_switches
Output details from the various switch hash-maps, including
switch.routed_networks and switch.base_network
Add <Firewall> elements
for each firewall in all_firewalls
Output details from the various firewall hash-maps, including
firewall.addresses and firewall.networks
close topo_file
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